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**From Onset to Sustained Protest: How Mass Nonviolent Movements Consolidate**  
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**INTRODUCTION**

In a matter of days Chile went from being a vibrant democracy to a closed society after the military coup of 1973. The junta consolidated power by disappearing, killing, imprisoning, and torturing its opponents. In response to this assault, much of civil society and the political elite demobilized, went into hiding or left the country. At the same time, proponents of armed action gained traction because of the perception that violence was the only way to end the dictatorship. This conflict did not escalate into civil war or large-scale political violence, however. Chile transitioned back to democracy after largely peaceful protests in 1989. What explains the emergence of mass mobilization against the Pinochet dictatorship in the early and late 1980s?

This chapter seeks to explain how opposition to authoritarian rule develops and consolidates in the face of repression. It seeks to uncover the process through which civil society is able to mount a significant challenge against the state by mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people. At the most general level, in regimes that are capable and willing to use violence against their citizens, most commonly a characteristic associated with authoritarian regimes (Lichbach 1987; Davenport et al. 2005; Davenport 2007), we will be less likely to observe mobilization. Social movement scholars explain this phenomenon through the political process model, which

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also treats repression as one of the most important explanatory variables. Political opportunities, ideological or cultural frames, and mobilizing structures counter the dampening effect that repression has on mobilization (McAdam et al. 1996). Resources, such as moral, cultural, social-organizational, human and material, can also explain the emergence of social mobilization against repressive regimes (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Francisco 1995, 2004, 2005; Klandermans and Roggeband 2007; Schneider 1995). These ideas are consistent with findings in the literature on insurgency and civil war, which also considers human resources such as organizing experience, networks and local embeddedness to be of fundamental importance for the emergence, survival and resilience of rebel groups (Finkel 2015, 2017; Lewis 2013, 2017).

Despite these general similarities between findings in the social movements and civil war literatures, there are notable differences. Research specifically focusing on civil resistance has recently found that the civil war onset model does not explain the emergence of nonviolent mobilization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Most of the explanatory factors in civil wars, such as mountainous terrain, weak states, civil wars in neighboring countries, and a declining GDP per capita are not significant or reversed in the case of nonviolent action (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). A comprehensive examination of the four major theoretical frameworks to explain the emergence of nonviolent mass movements finds that “grievance approaches, modernization theory, resource mobilization theory, and political opportunity approaches” do not satisfactorily explain the onset of major movements (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 298). In fact, some of the variables, such as key repression indicators, appear to reduce the accuracy of the nonviolent onset models.

Scholars have mainly derived these arguments inductively from qualitative case studies or large-N cross-national studies of movements that have already succeeded organizationally

(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Davenport 2014; Sharp et al. 2005; Goodwin 2001). The main theoretical problem with this approach is that these studies do not have insights from failed attempts to mobilize. By focusing on the movements that emerged, these studies completely miss the effects of repression. We know more about the effects of repression conditional on emergence than about how repression affects the onset and consolidation of movements. Have state crackdowns mostly been successful in demobilizing attempts to challenge the status quo? Or is state repression rarely able to prevent citizens from revolting? The question has for the most part remained under-theorized and the data that we have are inadequate to answer it.

Empirically, the problem is difficult to address. In the case of cross national studies, the datasets on which the arguments stand include cases of campaigns, movements, and insurgencies that have been able to organize large-scale resistance. They exclude mobilization that remains small or medium-size, as well as those that outright failed without reaching a critical mass of people. Most studies compare the localities where a large movement emerged with the places where no such movements were present, to make inferences about the conditions of onset. More recently, cross-national studies on political violence have been able to include many more cases by using PRIO/ UCDP datasets with a reduced the threshold of 25 battle deaths, though not to explain onset (Harbom et al. 2008). No such cross-country studies exist for mass popular struggles because of a lack of granular data that could systematically capture small-scale nonviolent anti-regime actions, or the patterns of repression against them. This information is missing with good reason because the data gathering effort that would be required to have full global coverage of small-scale nonviolent opposition would be gargantuan.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The Global Nonviolent Action Database (GNAD) at Swarthmore College led by George Lakey has small-scale nonviolent actions and global coverage, though it does not systematically include cases. The third iteration of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset,

Subnational studies, as well as case studies based on qualitative evidence, also tend to have the bias of focusing on larger movements. There are two notable exceptions, namely (Blee 2014) and (Lewis 2017, 2013), the first of which focuses on the emergence of nonviolent activism in a U.S. city, and the second examines the onset of armed insurgency in Uganda. Their insights and empirical strategy inform this chapter given their focus on networks, and their effort to include small and failed organizations. The dissertation expands this research by including antecedent organizations, namely civil society organizations that are not traditionally associated with resistance movements. These are cases that transform their organizations to espouse more extreme objectives and that often emerge from clandestinity to publicly oppose the regime (Johnston 2005; Lawrence 2013). The chapter also builds on this research by examining an authoritarian context, as well as by including armed, nonviolent and mixed anti-regime campaigns. The chapter also advances our understanding of repression and mobilization by theorizing and studying various forms of nonviolent and violent state repression.

It finds that alliance formation enables mass mobilization, and that repression conditions the forging of ties by civil society organizations. Rather than focusing on resources or on political opportunities generally, this research contends that violent repression has to remain below a certain level for mass mobilization to occur. Regardless of attenuating circumstances, such as dense networks, committed militants, financial support from the international community and others, hundreds of thousands or millions of people are very unlikely to participate in collective action if the state is perpetrating frequent indiscriminate or collective violence against large segments of the population.

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NAVCO 3.0, includes “politically relevant events from 1991-2012,” which expands the cases that it observes. However, the dataset is limited to “21 countries, the majority of which had major nonviolent or violent campaigns during this period.” (Chenoweth et al. 2018)

This chapter overcomes a variety of biases in the literature by dramatically expanding the observed cases. It also improves the conceptualization and measurement of mobilization and repression. In particular, the chapter uses a novel dataset of more than 1,600 opposition groups that operated during the Pinochet dictatorship to explain how a largely peaceful struggle from below emerged and prevailed after a decade of state violence. An opposition group is broadly defined as an association of individuals, regardless of its size and how formal or informal it is, which had, at some point during the Pinochet dictatorship, the goal of resisting the military government directly or indirectly. The goals can be reformist, such as changing economic, political and/or social policies of the regime, or maximalist, such as seeking regime change. The list of opposition groups comes from going through thousands of pages of Chilean and U.S. government archival materials, secondary literature and personal interviews with the protagonists of the conflict. The purpose of the dataset is to catalog all the opposition groups that existed in the most populated state in Chile, the Metropolitan Region, from 1973-1989, as well as yearly observations of various forms of government repression against each target during the same period. The dataset also contains organizational characteristics of the opposition groups, such as ideology, information about founders and leaders, factions, splinter groups, alliances, resources, and international support. By including all civil society organizations even before they started adopting overt anti-regime positions, this dataset allows us to glean insights into the stages prior to mass mobilization, and specifically, on the relationship between repression and the consolidation of popular struggles.

In addition to this dataset of opposition groups, I also qualitatively compiled information about all public actions against the Pinochet dictatorship using the secret reports of the Vicariate of Solidarity (Vicariate of Solidarity 1977-1989). In these monthly reports, the Vicariate of

Solidarity tracked all demonstrations of dissent, from very small protests and public letters to the Ministry of Interior, to medium-size protests and May Day events by labor unions. These reports also include the repression that resulted from these events. The documents are the primary source from where this chapter derives information about public demonstrations of dissent, narrative about alliances between groups, and their interaction with repression.

To further elaborate on the argument, the chapter contends that mass mobilization emerges and consolidates through a process of alliance formation, and that repression shapes the alliances that form in a very significant way. An alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their objectives, where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political or economic) associated with violating the agreement. For mass mobilization to occur, civil society organizations have to form alliances. There is not any single group in society, especially in a country under authoritarian rule, with the convening power to generate mass mobilization, except perhaps political parties if they exist and are allowed to operate in public. Therefore, if they are to mobilize the masses, organizations have to build coalitions.

For any civil society group confronted with the choice to form or join an alliance with other opposition groups in an authoritarian regime, there are two main competing considerations. The first is reducing the probability of suffering violent repression and the second one is achieving political success (i.e., changing government policies or overthrowing the regime). These priorities mean that each group wants to be part of a coalition that is large enough to win but not so large—or threatening in another way—that it increases repression to unmanageable levels. By unmanageable levels of repression I mean frequent targeting of militants with executions and torture, or forced disappearances. This level of repression forces opposition

groups to operate underground, if they continue to organize at all. In general, opposition groups that are targeted in this manner cannot survive in the realm of public action. Therefore, in making a choice to join an alliance, the size of the membership base of an opposition group, as well as the level of repression against that opposition group, are the most important explanatory factors. The larger the group the more attractive it is as an ally because large-scale participation makes success more likely. The more participants there are the less likely it is that each individual will be repressed, though this only applies to the average militant during protest crackdowns. The regime may perpetuate violence far beyond the protest, arresting and killing the leadership and mid-level organizers in their homes, for example. In fact, larger demonstrations may actually be more deadly because the state may respond to a larger threat with more force.

In addition to the size of the group, a history of being a target of unmanageable levels of repression makes the group very unattractive as an ally. Organizations will be extremely unlikely to join coalitions with groups that suffer high levels of repression. One exception is a group that operates under the umbrella of a protector institution, as described in the previous chapter. Opposition groups that enjoy some level of protection from the Catholic Church have more leeway in their ability to join a group that suffers a higher level of repression because increasing violence against protected groups is more costly for the state. In short, it is in every group's interest to be part of the largest possible coalition without increasing repression beyond a certain point. Given that groups cannot predict repression perfectly, they will adjust with experience and the process will be iterative. An alliance is unlikely to continue if it generates unmanageable levels of repression.

This theoretical framework places repression at the center of mass mobilization in authoritarian contexts. It acknowledges that the state can subject different groups within society

to very different patterns of repression (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017; Sullivan 2016) and that these patterns are subject to change over time. Conceptualizing and measuring repression at the state level, or restricting observations to the state's response to protests, as most studies about the onset of mass mobilization do, have impeded our ability to understand the process through which small-scale opposition consolidates into mass mobilization. This chapter's argument about alliance formation being driven by numbers and repression also suggests that in confronting a capable and repressive state, ideology and identity are comparatively far less important predictors of alliances.

The following section reviews the scholarly literature on the emergence of movements more in depth. It also provides an in depth discussion about the patterns of repression that the state perpetrated against different actors, and how it changed through the 18 years of the dictatorship. The chapter then presents the theory explaining the emergence and consolidation of mass mobilization. A section on methodology and data follows the theory. Descriptive statistics, parametric results, and network graphs are then presented in support of the theory, though there are some unexpected findings with respect to nonviolent repression. Finally, the conclusion details the main findings and implications.

## **EXPLAINING MASS MOBILIZATION**

My research question is most directly related to the literature on how mass popular struggles and armed insurgencies transition from onset to building a sustained opposition. Maintaining a mass popular struggle, especially against strong states willing to use repression, requires persistent alliances between organizations that are able to operate in difficult circumstances. In what follows the chapter describes the three main theories that provide explanations for the emergence

and consolidation of mass mobilization. It first examines the political process model, which incorporates opportunities; mobilizing structures, such as organizations and networks; and framing processes. Then the chapter discusses arguments about resources and organizational structure, followed by theories that focus specifically on repression.

### **The Political Process Model (PPM)**

The first approach comes from the literature on contentious politics, particularly that on social movement organizations (SMOs), and it is mainly concerned with major public movements. The political process model seeks to explain the emergence and development of popular mobilization by focusing on three factors, namely political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing (Snow et al. 2013) Political opportunities are temporary, dynamic or more stable advantages that facilitate protest activity, or circumstances that weaken the regime and thus make mobilization more likely. The relative openness or closure of the political system, elite cohesion, the regime's allies, and the state's capacity and propensity for repression are all examples of opportunities or threats to mobilization (Jasper and Goodwin 2011; McAdam et al. 1996; McAdam et al. 2001). In the case of Chile, factors such as the closure of civil society space and the regime's capacity and willingness to repress have some explanatory power. When the secret police DINA operated with few restraints in their efforts to eliminate leftists, Chileans did not mobilize in large numbers. At the same time, the Catholic Church's protection, and Chile's historic ties to the West and to international organizations enabled mobilization by decreasing the cost of mobilization and by increasing the cost of state violence. These opportunities are important to understand the general pattern in the country.

However, Chileans faced severe constraints with the level of repression concurrently with considerable opportunities given the Catholic Church's protection and the international

community's outcry. The political process model is not as helpful to examine these situations. It does not bring the analysis to a specific level enough to draw inferences about the resulting effect of these competing threats and opportunities. This chapter specifies the form, frequency, and target of state repression, and their effects on the processes that antecede mass mobilization, such as alliance formation.

Beyond the distinction between short-lived and structural advantages, scholars have theorized about other categories of political opportunities, such as discursive and perceived ones. Discursive opportunities get at the idea that the claims and identities of the social movement organization may or may not relate well to the prevailing discourse in the public domain. Moreover, political opportunities are not objective; activists cannot identify them independently and without context. Rather, specific actors interpret them in the moment. In the case of Chile, and more broadly in regimes that are not totalitarian, the process of framing the movement and building a discourse that resonates, does not apply as strongly to explain mobilization. This chapter argues that there were more than enough people in Chile who disliked the Pinochet dictatorship, supported the Allende administration, and wanted to change the economic and political system. There was also information about how much repression people would be willing to bear without demobilizing, in part due to the small and medium-sized protests that were ongoing throughout the dictatorship. These facts suggest that preference falsification and a lack of a common discourse may not have as much explanatory power in non-totalitarian settings (Kuran 1989, 1997). This chapter also contrasts to the view that opportunities are subjective. The chapter identifies a threshold above which mass mobilization is exceedingly implausible. Instead of being subjective or contextual, repression's effects are complex and require specificity. Theorizing the pattern of repression (Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood 2017) and its varying effects on

mobilization are how this dissertation manages the complex interaction between punishment and high-risk collective action.

### ***Mobilizing Structures***

Mobilizing structures is the second factor of the political process model, which posits that established organizations make mobilization more likely because they provide networks and other resources (Klandermans and Roggeband 2007; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1978). Similarly, (Sutton et al. 2014, 559-563) and (Francisco 1995, 2004) find that protests with organizations behind them are more likely to be resilient to repression: “We find evidence that a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization and security defections after violent repression...From this we argue that attacks on spontaneous protests are unlikely to result in political jiu-jitsu...” Organizations can also create new opportunities (Tilly 2008). Public actions by the relatives of the disappeared, such as their hunger strike in May 1978, led college students to show their dissatisfaction with the regime by organizing a demonstration in support of the hunger strike. One could argue that students saw an opportunity to publicly protest along with the hunger strike given that the risks were controlled: the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity was protecting the relatives of the disappeared in their action,<sup>3</sup> students had observed the relatives carry out with their public action without state violence for a few days, and there was international and national attention in the media. The question is why this political opportunity, and others, did not lead to mass protests. Chile did not mobilize at a large scale until 1983.

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<sup>3</sup> The hunger strike took place in a Catholic congregation, priests were there to support their effort spiritually, and the Vicariate of Solidarity set up health, psychiatric, and other types of support for the strikers (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, May 1978).

Scholars of Chile have also found organizations to be important for mobilization, though not just because of their networks and resources. Schneider (1997)—in a similar approach to (Putnam and Nanetti 1994)'s on democracy and civic traditions in Italy, and (Varshney 2003)'s on inter-communal violence in India—explains the emergence of persistent anti-Pinochet protest in shantytowns in Santiago through the organizing work of the Communist Party. The Communists had, during the democratic period, cultivated political operatives and community leaders in various areas in the country. Even though these were precisely the places hardest hit by the military junta, Schneider argues that they were also the quickest to regroup after the coup, to sustain activism, and to consolidate public protests as soon as the repression permitted some level of action. The networks, organizations, and experience from the past allowed these communities to effectively oppose a very different regime.

While Schneider makes a compelling case about the shantytowns in Santiago that she studied, there are questions that arise about mechanisms and scope conditions. First, it is not clear if other aspects of the ideology and socialization of the Communist Party are doing the work, or if it is the organizing during intense periods of party activism that is responsible for successful mobilization. In order to adjudicate between organizing capacity and aspects of the Communist ideology (such as that it attracts the most fervent and committed activists), Schneider could have studied communities where other political parties, such as the Christian Democrats, forged ties with the local community and developed operatives. If the same pattern of successful mobilization were observed in active Christian Democratic communities as were observed in active Communist communities, then Schneider's theory about pre-existing organizing would be more persuasive.

Further, the evidence that Schneider provides is compatible with a different argument, which (Finkel 2015, 2017) puts forth. Instead of arguing that a community is organizationally successful in spite of the violence, Finkel argues that it is because of past experience with selective repression that learning takes place and that dissidents develop better organizing skills. Finkel places more emphasis on the learning and skills that flow from past experience with selective repression, while Schneider focuses on pre-existing organizations, networks, and structures from which to build future dissidence. Even if pre-existing organizing is reduced to militants skills, one would have to show that the skills and networks created during peacetime are those that will serve people building an opposition in a dictatorial and extremely repressive setting.

Secondly, given that the Catholic Church in Chile also organized those communities, and even more so during the dictatorship, it is unclear how one can attribute the capacity to the Communist Party. Even though Schneider includes the religious community in her narrative, it is unclear how it connects to her theory about successful mobilization. In short, an explanation that centers on alliance formation and repression is not necessarily incompatible with Schneider's account of mobilization in Santiago's shantytowns. Instead, it seeks to further explore what the Communist Party did in these *poblaciones* to foster organizing and alliances to sustain mass mobilization. It was not only the Communist Party, however. The chapter argues that it was the work of hundreds of civil society organizations, political parties, religious organizations, unions, and others.

Moreover, the dataset of opposition groups presented in this chapter is in part designed to test this theory about whether or not sustained mobilization has strong organizations behind them compared to public actions that die down. This chapter shows that dozens if not hundreds of

public actions that did not consolidate were organized, led and drew people from strong organizations (i.e., cohesive groups without factions or splinter groups), even the same ones that were then able to consolidate them in the early 1980s. Further, when it comes to political parties, the case of Chile does not support (Sutton et al. 2014)'s example of the Ivory Coast, which argues that political parties do not draw different sectors of the population together for mass mobilization to occur. The main political parties in Chile, such as the Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Communists were major institutions that connected many sectors in society, including labor unions, the working poor, people of faith, the economic elite, intellectuals, and the middle class.

### ***Resource Mobilization Theory***

Social movement scholars also point to resources to explain the emergence of protest and opposition groups, particularly by disadvantaged groups in society (McCarthy and Zald 1977). "Human time and effort along with money" are the most common resources that movements need to emerge and consolidate, though there are many other types of resources that the literature has pointed to, making a "fivefold typology of moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources." (Edwards and McCarthy 2003) Opposition groups will develop into successful organizations depending on their material resources, their networks, and social embeddedness (Lewis 2013; Staniland 2014). In explaining how rebel groups in Uganda are able to transition from onset to sustained mobilization, Lewis (2013) argues that the most important factor is avoiding government detection until the insurgency is able to withstand repression. Groups that worked through (ethnically) homogenous networks were able to maintain secrecy and enjoy a higher level of security than those that did not have deep ties to the communities in which they were based. Local networks and social embeddedness are crucial not only for

survival, but also to ensure growth and sustained mobilization. Indeed, locals are also the most important source of recruits for incipient rebel organizations.

Lewis' theory is designed to explain insurgencies in weaker states with particular ethnic compositions and historical divides. It may not be possible for weak rebel groups in strong states, for example, to maintain secrecy while procuring arms and recruiting people by only working through ethnic networks. Tight networks and forging relations with locals were not sufficient to ensure secrecy and a secure environment for opposition groups in Chile. The Pinochet regime had enough capacity and will to go after groups even in remote areas of the country.

(Staniland 2012, 2014) attributes the success and cohesion of a rebel group to the pre-war networks in which it is embedded. Depending on the level of integration of the members of the rebel group (horizontal ties) and the level of integration between the members and the local community (vertical ties), there are four types of insurgencies that can develop: the integrated, parochial, vanguard, and fragmented. The most successful organization is the integrated, as its leaders are embedded in social bases with strong vertical and horizontal ties. The organization that is least likely to succeed is the fragmented, as its horizontal and vertical ties are both weak. Even though the pre-war networks determine the kind of organization that rebels can create during wartime, these designations are not static. The dataset that this chapter presents can partly test Staniland's argument in the context of an authoritarian regime rather than civil war. Instead of rebel groups, one can measure the level of cohesion and fractionalization of civil society organizations, as well as the background of their founders and leaders. That said, the case of Chile shows that cohesion and embeddedness are not sufficient for large-scale opposition to consolidate, as chapter 2 demonstrates. These two variables are also not strong predictors of alliance formation, which this chapter argues is a key part of the process of mass mobilization.

In short, the political process model is helpful but insufficient in explaining how mass mobilization emerges and consolidates. Its imprecise terminology makes the concepts of political opportunities and resources overlap, and the lack of specificity makes it difficult to theorize the confluence of political opportunities and threats (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer 2004). This chapter works with the idea of mobilizing structures and their networks in the PPM, and extends it by focusing on the antecedent civil society organizations that enable mass mobilization. However, the presence of organizations is not enough for high-risk collective action to become probable. Groups have to forge ties for actions to grow and be sustainable. The theoretical framework proposed in this chapter thus specifies the conditions under which these civil society organizations will forge alliances and build their capacity to convene the masses.

### **Organizational Structure**

The second set of arguments emphasizes organizational structure to explain the success of opposition groups. The literature on organizational structure has also extensively studied the advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical and decentralized or networked organizations. (Heger et al. 2012) argue that hierarchy is a sufficient, though not a necessary, condition for dissident group efficiency. Specifically, the authors argue hierarchical insurgencies benefit from clear agenda setting, centralized command and control, better accountability, and specialization within units, which makes them more lethal and more organizationally successful as armed groups (Hegel et al. 2012).

On the other hand, clandestine groups organized in small cells with weak communication links to leaders avoid government detection, mitigate the effects of repression, and increase the likelihood of survival (Comas et al. 2014). Network scholars argue that decentralized dissident organizations benefit from increased “adaptability, resilience [even if through redundancy], a

capacity for rapid innovation and learning, and wide-scale recruitment...better at exploiting new modes of collaboration and communication.” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008, 8) As (Gutiérrez Sanín and Giustozzi 2010) argue, insurgencies do not face the same strategic challenges. Some are better off being “nearer to civil society” through embedded networks, while others will be more organizationally successful if they organize like an army, prioritizing internal cohesion (Gutiérrez Sanín and Giustozzi 2010, 837).

There is also research pointing to mass protest movements benefiting from decentralization and multiple leadership hubs to disperse power and increase resilience (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Norms of reciprocity, trust, and reputational concerns hold members in line in these types of organizations, while there are more formal accountability and punishment mechanisms that are possible in hierarchical organizations. This organizational form is important for mass mobilization because of the imperative to not only increase the membership base, but also to diversify constituencies (Gutiérrez Sanín and Giustozzi 2010).

As these arguments demonstrate, there are tradeoffs to the type of organizational structure and important consequences that flow from the form. While Heger et al. (2012) argue that hierarchy is best for efficiency by showing that hierarchical groups are better at carrying out interventions (e.g., killings) than decentralized insurgents, it may be the case that group strength is responsible for efficiency rather than structure. Networked insurgent groups tend to be weaker—relative to the state they are confronting—than groups that are able to develop a hierarchy. The structure that an organization takes is endogenous to its strength and thus to its ability to carry out interventions efficiently. As Podolny and Page point out, researchers that focus on the functionality of structure are “prone to neglect constraints that underlie the formation of network forms of organization.” (Podolny and Page 1998, 59) The dataset on

opposition groups in the Metropolitan Region of Chile will help overcome some of these methodological challenges given that it is time-series. Though it cannot give us the confidence of an experiment, by coding organizational form and repression at the group-year level, as well as a host of other variables, this dataset can show the conditions under which certain structures are more likely to lead to successful antecedent organizations, to groups that are able to sustain small and medium-sized protests despite high levels of repression, and eventually to mass mobilization when hundreds of organizations build alliances. In particular, this dissertation argues that the optimal organizational structure depends on the pattern of repression that the opposition group is facing. As argued in the chapter on the top targets of the Pinochet dictatorship (Chapter 2), a clandestine cell-structure increased the likelihood of survival given the secret police's relentless infiltration campaign, and practice of detention and torture. The structure of the victims groups—open and hierarchical—was very different and effective in organizing public protests and degrading the regime's legitimacy.

Another approach to organizational structure emphasizes the category-network nexus and the importance of inclusivity, or how much of one's life the organization absorbs. The "more extensive [the] common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group." (Tilly 1978, 63; White 1965) An organization is made up of a category component and a network component, and they both go from low to high. An example of a group that is low on both category and network is a casual crowd; low on networks but high in category are all Brazilians, for example; low on category but high on network is a friendship network; and high on both category and network is a local union. The amount of time and commitment that an organization requires of its members—inclusivity as defined by Tilly (1978, 64)—is also an important feature of group structure. An organization like the FARC, for example, is very high on inclusivity

because fighters have to leave their families, live in remote camps, and change their lives completely. While inclusivity can ensure a superior level of socialization, discipline, and efficiency, burnout rates are much higher in these types of organizations than in less demanding ones (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2014).

A mass people power campaign, on the other hand, may be low on inclusivity, as some participants may protest sporadically and take part in low-cost boycotts. These kinds of organizations may be able to generate large numbers of supporters (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012), but they will almost certainly be less disciplined and more prone to collapse as time goes by and the costs of participation increase. This relationship between size and discipline is important to consider in alliance formation. The chapter's contention is that groups will still choose to join alliances with larger groups as long as repression does not become unmanageable. But a testable alternative hypothesis is that as the size of alliances increases there is a point after which there is a decreasing marginal return to joining another alliance, thereby making the relationship more of an inverted-U shape.

### **Repression**

The third set of explanations places most emphasis on repression to explain successful mobilization. (Finkel 2015, 2017) argues that sustaining resistance requires skillful rebel leaders, and these skills are acquired through past personal experience with selective repression. The “resister's toolkit” that Finkel proposes focuses on the routine day-to-day operations of rebel groups rather than on goal setting, framing, resonance, etc. (Davenport, 2014)'s theory about demobilization posits that groups can survive if they effectively vet members to avoid infiltration, build trust inside the group, and develop the capacity to predict and prepare for the kind of government repression that the group will face. Through his study of the Republic of

New Africa in the United States, Davenport argues that opposition groups can experiment with the level of radicalism that they embrace in terms of objectives, with the clarity of their goals, their level of openness, and the hierarchical nature of their organization in order to mitigate the effects of repression.

While a history of selective repression partly explains the MIR's survival, it is less clear how the resister's toolkit could be extended to skills that are useful for mass mobilization. The qualities of those who survive frequent and targeted assassinations by going underground, as well as the organizational structure developed to cope with this pattern of repression, are very different from those required for mass mobilization. Connections and alliances—the opposite of cell structures and compartmentalization—are what makes mass public mobilization possible. The dissertation finds that mass mobilization emerges from groups that are able to operate above ground because repression against them is not as severe. Militants who are subject to the most deadly force can, however, also play a role in mass mobilization by avoiding being identified with the targeted group and by organizing through other opposition groups (as long as they are not part of the leadership or are easily identifiable members of the targeted group).

This chapter builds on (Sullivan, 2016)'s approach to studying repression, which does not exclusively consider state repression as a consequence to overt mass mobilization—covert and small-scale actions, as well as a variety of forms of repression, are theorized and measured empirically. While Sullivan is concerned with explaining variation in state repression, this dissertation examines mobilization and its relationship to repression. Sullivan argues, and this chapter is consistent with the idea, that governments “aim to improve the specificity of their expectations by monitoring their citizenry to identify the observable indicators heralding the development of the most threatening overt collective challenges.” (Sullivan 2016, 1167)

However, this chapter departs from Sullivan's model of state repression and mobilization in two ways. It finds that the military junta in Chile not only responded with repression when there were overt actions that signaled radical transformations as their objectives. Though repression was less lethal against groups with moderate objectives, the regime considered threatening actions by groups with reformist objectives because of the understanding that they may become so in the future. The formation of alliances signals challenger development and is thus threatening to the regime in power, even if the coalition's objectives are not anti-regime yet (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, September 1977). The size of the alliance that is formed, and the reputation, legitimacy and the ideology of the groups joining forces, are important factors that states consider when choosing to repress. The reason is that the government recognizes that some groups and alliances may be making moderate demands to avoid the worst of the repression, but their intention is to make more radical demands in the future. The larger the coalition the riskier it is for the regime.

But there are also constraints on repression against these groups because, as Sullivan says, using violence against nonviolent and moderate groups is far costlier than against more radical and/or violent groups. In the case of Chile, though, the source of these costs was not only domestic, but also international. Pinochet and the military junta were concerned about their reputation, which was suffering following reports of gross human rights violations that the United States, as well as regional organizations such as the OAS and international NGOs like Amnesty International, were using to shame the regime (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, May 1978). These constraints, coupled with the protective force of the Catholic Church, enabled the formation of alliances and the consolidation of mass mobilization in the early 1980s.

Second, Sullivan's model seems to imply that there is a clear-cut rule that states use to repress. His hypothesis 2b predicts that "[i]ncreases in political repression are not expected to take place when mobilizers support less radical demands," which is confirmed by data from Guatemala. In Chile, repression was certainly not limited to organizations with revolutionary or maximalist objectives. As becomes clear in the descriptive statistics of the dataset in this chapter and in the chapter on protector institutions, as well as in the Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports, the junta repressed victims groups, art organizations, women's groups asking for social reforms, and even led libelous campaigns in the media and harassed people connected to the Vicariate of Solidarity and other faith-based organizations. This finding by Sullivan is surprising especially because he includes covert forms of repression, such as surveillance and initiating investigations. Instead, this chapter works from the assumption that even reformist groups can be repressed and that alliances make organizations a higher risk to the government. Further, the process of alliance formation and thus of mass mobilization can be—and is often—derailed when the government decides to crack down more harshly. Activists test the limits of their actions, and adapt their tactics, through this iterative process with the regime.

Beyond these points of departure for this research question, there are currently no satisfactory explanations for the emergence of mass civil resistance campaigns. As Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) show, models that predict civil wars are woefully inadequate for mass nonviolent movements. The main attempts to theorize the onset of mass movements, such as the political opportunities approaches,<sup>4</sup> the grievance model,<sup>5</sup> and the modernization perspective,<sup>6</sup> do

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<sup>4</sup> (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Levitsky and Way 2010; Robertson 2010)

<sup>5</sup> (Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007; Francisco, 2004, 2005; Khawaja, 1993; Koopmans, 1993; Kurzman, 2004; Lee, Maline, & Moore, 2000; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Oberschall, 1994; Rasler, 1996; S. G. Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 2003)

<sup>6</sup> (Goldstone, 1991; Gurr, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 2014)

somewhat better than the civil war model (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017). But there is still a considerable amount of unexplained variance in large-scale popular mobilization. One of the most important factors in these theories is repression, and findings on how crackdowns affect mobilization remain unclear. By including cross-national indicators for repression, some of these models become even less accurate than without this information, suggesting that “generalized repression makes the onset of nonviolent episodes relatively unpredictable.” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 18)

There are four primary challenges with determining the effects of repression on mobilization. The first challenge has to do with temporality. Most research examines mobilization once it has been able to consistently produce disruptive large-scale actions. But this snapshot does not allow us to observe its antecedents, thereby making it difficult if not impossible to understand onset. This chapter shows that civil society organizations can become incubators of mass resistance through a process of alliance formation when the state response to public actions is not as violent.

Secondly, scholars have generally not made distinctions between the specific targets of repression and the segments of society that are mobilizing or could potentially mobilize.<sup>7</sup> Recent work on violence in civil wars by (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017) recommends best practices for those examining violence and its effects. Instead of characterizing state repression at the national level as “high,” “medium” or “low,” for example, the pattern of violence perpetrated by an actor has a specific targeting, frequency, and technique. The Chilean Armed Forces and secret police DINA targeted leaders and mid-level operatives from leftist and ultra-leftist political parties (targets), and systematically tortured, executed, and disappeared them (frequency and

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<sup>7</sup> Exceptions are Finkel’s work on Jewish resistance against the Nazis and Janet Lewis’ work on how rebellion begins in Uganda (Finkel 2015, 2017; Lewis 2013, 2017).

technique). During the same period of time in Chile, the relatives of the victims, who tended to be women and politically active on the left (targets), were frequently harassed and arrested but quickly released (frequency and technique) by the Chilean security forces.

Therefore, within the same year and in the same locality the same security agencies used repression in different ways. This chapter puts forth the argument that lower levels of repression (in terms of frequency and technique) make public mobilization far more likely, and that mass public opposition is nearly impossible when there is indiscriminate or broad targeting and frequent use severe forms of repression. Making these distinctions elucidates the fact that depending on the pattern of repression, first movers—from where mass movements emerge—in a particular time and place may be very different from one another. Thus far the literature has discussed first movers as a general category or a “type” of individual (Bueno de Mesquita 2010). These are important conceptual and theoretical shortcomings that this dissertation attempts to overcome in the case of mass mobilization in Chile.

The third challenge that has made disentangling the effects of repression very difficult is empirical. The lack of fine-grained data on repression, targeting, and mobilization has not allowed for the testing of more complex relationships across time.<sup>8</sup> States have an impressive array of techniques of repression, including but not limited to different forms of violence. The Pinochet dictatorship used searches, forced displacement, various forms of harassment, mass layoffs, libelous propaganda campaigns against individuals and organizations, states of emergency and curfews, legal restrictions against unions, and other forms of nonviolent repression. There are few if any scholarly works that examine these forms of repression, let alone in conjunction with violent forms of repression and targeting different types of actors.

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<sup>8</sup> One notable exception is the work by (Brockett 2005), where the author examines protest life cycles and their relationship to repression.

Mobilization research is also quite restricted and siloed. Most research either investigates armed insurgencies or large-scale protest movements and civil resistance campaigns. There is some research on mixed movements—those that combine the use of armed and unarmed action—and far less on smaller groups regardless of strategy. There is even less on underground or clandestine mobilization (della Porta, 2013). A key insight from including the range of repression and being precise about the repertoire, as well as from examining the full range of mobilization, is that people can organize regardless of the level of repression. When a group is targeted with frequent disappearances and executions, their chances of consolidating public opposition is nil. But those are the groups that challenge the state from the underground, as I show with the MIR, and Communist and Socialist parties.

Finally, the fourth challenge to studying repression has to do with its highly endogenous relationship to mobilization. Although this chapter does not experimentally address this difficulty, the dataset presented here makes progress on this matter by including a representative sample of all documented attempts to mobilize, however small, as well as time-series data on alliances, a variety of repression indicators, and many other covariates. Therefore, in addition to theorizing on the endogenous relationship between mobilization and repression, this chapter is empirically equipped to evaluate it as best as it can be done with observational data.

## **HOW PUBLIC OPPOSITION EMERGES AND CONSOLIDATES**

This section describes the process that led to the first large-scale demonstrations against the Pinochet dictatorship, which is mainly based on the Vicariate of Solidarity's confidential reports. This discussion is followed by a summary of the mobilization that we should observe from different sectors of the population depending on the pattern of repression against each. It also

teases out the theoretical implications in a more abstract way, and discusses counterfactuals, to be able to generalize.

### **The Process of Mass Movement Consolidation in Pinochet's Chile**

In the weeks and months following the coup of September 11, 1973 the Chilean Armed Forces called a state of emergency and perpetrated an intense campaign of collective and indiscriminate repression. The violence was collective in the sense that the military junta, while consolidating power after the coup, sought to demobilize the recently deposed Popular Unity government, militants from other leftist and ultra-leftist political movements, and powerful organizations closely aligned with the left such as labor unions. The repression was also partly indiscriminate because the Armed Forces used proxies to identify opponents and potential opponents of the regime: they arrested college students in public universities and working class people, for example, assuming that they were likely Communist, Socialist, MIR militants, or leftist sympathizers. Individuals also became victims because they were unlucky to be in the wrong place at the wrong time (Rettig, 1991).

During this time, there was also extensive legal and nonviolent repression. The military junta stripped away the power of labor unions. Most importantly, the government removed their rights to collectively bargain and strike, and prohibited union members from electing their own leaders. Instead, the junta removed those who had been elected, in many cases disappeared or executed them, and appointed new union leaders (Araya, 2015). The new military government also closed down independent media, including newspapers, magazines and radio stations, and banned all leftist and centrist political parties. Even the Christian Democrats, whose most prominent leaders initially supported the coup, were outlawed. Finally, the regime installed a

countrywide state of emergency and a nighttime curfew, whereby no one could be seen on the streets between midnight and 6am (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, 1976-1981).

In this context, mobilization changed in four respects: First, the majority of the population became atomized and isolated because the collective and semi-indiscriminate repression disrupted ties to neighbors, co-workers, and even family members (Interviewee 33, April 2016 and April 2017, Santiago, Chile). Not knowing what sort of precedent, comment, or action could put them at risk, or who could be an informer for the security forces, most people became extremely fearful of expressing their views. Chileans even avoided casual socializing (Interviewee 117, April 2016, Santiago, Chile). Even though these conditions significantly reduced mobilization, and a mass protest movement would have been extremely unlikely, it did not preclude all types of organizing by all actors. The most committed leftist party militants went underground and continued to organize in clandestinity and labor unions were largely demobilized. Strikingly, this pattern of repression completely eliminated public opposition for a few years from the two most powerful sectors of civil society during the Allende administration—political parties and unions.

The first domestic public actions opposing the military junta came from the family members of the victims of the regime. This mobilization occurred in response to repression and their political demands were very minimalistic; they simply wanted to know the whereabouts of their loved ones. During this period there were also other forms of public dissent, though in the form of statements and letters, particularly from the international community. The United Nations, the Organization of American States, Amnesty International and the Red Cross were the most common organizations demanding information about the human rights violations reported by the Vicariate of Solidarity. There were also a few of these types of public statements from the

elite within Chile, such as by the wife of Nobel Literature Laureate Pablo Neruda, Matilde Urrutia de Neruda.<sup>9</sup> Whether it is public actions by the relatives of the victims, or public statements by the international community and the domestic elite, their government demands always remain narrow. There are no cases of public maximalist claims with these levels of repression.

By 1974 and 1975 repression became less indiscriminate, with the DINA and armed forces focusing on eliminating the threat of Communism and Marxism by killing or disappearing leaders, medium-rank militants, and sometimes low-level operatives of the major leftist parties—the Communists, Socialists, Popular Unity—and of ultra-leftist and armed organizations, such as MIR, GAP and Red September.<sup>10</sup> Given the high intensity (i.e., frequency and lethality) of violent repression against these actors, the most committed leftist party militants continued to organize underground, if at all. Many militants were forced to flee the country and to seek exile.

Further, the systematic targeting of leftist party militants mirrored the repression that labor union leaders suffered. The reason is the high degree of connection between the two sectors. Indeed, the unionized working poor made up the base of the Communist Party of Chile, and many prominent Communist leaders also held powerful positions in labor unions. But by the second year of the dictatorship, recently demobilized labor union leaders, many of whom were unemployed, started organizing in secret. Through apolitical programs run by the Catholic

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<sup>9</sup> Pablo Neruda, a known member of the Communist Party of Chile, died soon after the coup of September 11, 1973. The military junta may have assassinated him:

[https://elpais.com/cultura/2015/11/09/actualidad/1447089245\\_554884.html](https://elpais.com/cultura/2015/11/09/actualidad/1447089245_554884.html)

<sup>10</sup> GAP were the Group of Personal Friends (*Grupo de Amigos Personales*), the security service of President Salvador Allende that tried to protect the presidential palace of *La Moneda* as it was being bombed by the Armed Forces rebelling on September 11, 1973. Red September was a small armed group that tried to form shortly after the coup, but it was detected by the Chilean and U.S. intelligence services and completely eliminated (United States Embassy, Chile. Confidential, Cable. March 31, 1977: 11 pp. National Security Archive Collection: Chile and the United States)

Church to help the working poor and the unemployed, labor union leaders started regrouping. At this point they made no demands and focused their efforts on planning major activities to continue uniting workers around May Day (May 1, international day honoring workers). Interestingly, labor unions and the families of the victims both started organizing under the protection of the Catholic Church.

The relatives of victims' groups flourished during this period by the side of the Catholic Church given the continued assault on leftist party militants. The more collective and less indiscriminate repression meant that the families of the killed and disappeared had a lot in common and were relentless in their efforts: they were not only grieving for the loss of a loved one (or many loved ones), but they also had political affiliation in common. Even though in many cases these women were also leftist party militants themselves, as party identification and commitment were passed down inter-generationally, repression against them was limited to detentions, beatings during arrests, and harassment and threats, in large part given the protection of the Catholic Church and their narrow demands (Interviewee 37, May 2016 and April 2017, Santiago, Chile).

At the same time, a vast number of civil society organizations started emerging at the very local level with narrow, subsistence-based objectives in order to alleviate poverty at a time of economic restructuring, mass layoffs, and families losing their primary breadwinner because of repression. The poverty rate doubled from 20 to 40 percent and unemployment reached 17 percent by 1985.<sup>11</sup> Supported with resources from the Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches and the wider religious community in Chile and abroad, hundreds of neighborhood associations started forming in shantytowns (*poblaciones*). While the resources for these efforts

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<sup>11</sup> United Nations Development Program Report by Frances Stewart and Gustav Ranis (1994): [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/frances\\_stewart\\_and\\_gustav\\_ranis.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/frances_stewart_and_gustav_ranis.pdf)

came from the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the local congregation, those running the day-to-day operations and participating in the programs were the working poor, shantytown dwellers, and militants recently demobilized from the leftist parties, hiding from state persecution. Demobilized MIR militants, for example, who found it too risky to continue organizing in clandestinity and following the movement's orders, moved into different *poblaciones* and joined these sorts of neighborhood associations to help the poor.

By 1978 Pinochet had dissolved the secret police DINA under pressure, especially from the families of the victims and President Jimmy Carter in the United States. There were no more forced disappearances after this point, though high (in terms of lethality and frequency) selective repression continued against leftist party militants. Restrictions against labor unions and other types of legal repression, such as the state of emergency, continued. However, in March 1978 the military junta ended the nighttime curfew. The Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports also document a significant decrease in arrests by this point, though it is not because of a reduction in public actions, as described below. In addition, Pinochet released hundreds of prisoners through the “*ley de extrañamiento*” (Decreto Supremo 504), which dictated that people who had violated the curfew would have their sentences commuted to forced exile. They were essentially expelled from the country and could not come back unless they had written permission from the government authorities.<sup>12</sup>

During this period (middle of 1978), and for the first time since the coup, we observe sporadic medium-size protests connected to protected activism (i.e., activism with some level of support from the Catholic Church as the protector institution). For example, the first medium-

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<sup>12</sup> Pinochet signed this executive mandate in 1975, but it is not until 1978 that people are actually getting their sentences commuted: <http://www.cedocmuseodelamemoria.cl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Decreto-504-Joqu%C3%ADn-Sáez-Salazar1.pdf>

size gathering recorded in the secret reports is a demonstration by hundreds of university students in June 1978 (almost five years into the dictatorship). The students were rallying in solidarity for the women on hunger strike seeking information about their disappeared family members. Approximately 400 students were arrested during the action, beaten, and threatened while in prison. But the authorities released all the students the following day. While the demonstrators suffered beatings and arrest, these actions and the repression that followed started delineating viable ways of publicly opposing the regime. Demonstrations alongside protected activism became more common during the latter half of 1978 and 1979, and the repression that followed each action communicated that some forms of mobilization (with specific goals, size, and protagonists) could be organized without a high likelihood of being killed, severely tortured or disappeared.

Labor unions also increased their mobilization by holding larger rallies around May Day and organizing their first major strike since the coup, which happened at the copper mine of Chuquicamata in northern Chile in September 1978 (there were 69 detentions as a result). These actions were not more ambitious in terms of their political objectives, however: Labor unions were still making minimalist demands to the authorities. Labor unions also started writing public letters and making petitions advocating for the end of the state of emergency, which had stripped them of their right to strike and to collectively bargain. In their letters to the government, union leaders argued that their rights should be reinstated because labor had not broken any rules up to that point and the country was not under internal or external threat (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, March 1978). In some letters toward the end of 1978, union leaders do mention state repression and demand information about the disappeared.

Elite level petitions, public statements, and letters, especially to the Minister of Interior and the President of the Supreme Court, vastly increased during this period, but they were still limited to questions about human rights violations and to requests for information about the disappeared. No letter or public statement from within the country explicitly called for an end to the dictatorship and a return to democracy, which would constitute maximalist objectives. The pressure from the international community also increased through public reports documenting human rights violations, and hearings held at the United Nations and Organization of American States meetings about repression in Chile.

Given this public outrage from the domestic elite and the international community, which seemed coordinated in terms of messaging with the cause of the relatives of the victims, the military junta started pressuring the Vicariate of Solidarity. Starting in early 1978, according to the secret reports, the pro-Pinochet press and the military junta led an intense propaganda and libelous campaign to discredit the Cardinal, bishops and priests. The Vicariate of Solidarity staff, particularly the attorneys and social workers, also started getting harassed and threatened at home and on the street by anonymous civilians.

Finally, large-scale mobilization in Chile occurs when civil society organizations start building persistent alliances. Mass public opposition consolidates by the building of alliances between groups because it is very difficult for any single organization to generate enough participation in order to sustain mass public actions. The process in Chile started when the small-scale and consistent mobilization of protected activists connected with the sporadic, medium-size actions by different segments of the population. At the same time, hundreds of subsistence-based groups started becoming more political, and joining the small and medium-level actions. This process occurs by repeatedly testing repression through action. Taking the example of the

students demonstrating in solidarity with the hunger strike: they were arrested, released, and mostly safe, and they assumed that future similar actions would provoke a comparable response, with some risk that the crackdown would be worse. Dozens of these types of actions start revealing the open spaces in society, however limited, for participants and would-be participants.

In addition, as soon as repression becomes more manageable, hundreds of atomized and apolitical neighborhood associations start hosting political meetings and slowly evolving into incubators of opposition. The reason is that the majority of those working in neighborhood associations are leftist party militants who have been demobilized due to the repression (Interviewee 33, April 2017, Santiago, Chile). As described above, MIR militants who wanted to reduce their chances of being persecuted, changed their identity, moved to another neighborhood and started helping the poor through apolitical organizations sponsored by the Catholic Church. These activities carried far lower risks than doing party work in clandestinity (Interviewee 35, November 2015 and April 2017, Santiago de Chile).

### **The Logic of Alliance Formation Preceding Mass Mobilization: Hypotheses**

But what is the logic by which these alliances form? Which organizations are going to cooperate? Under what conditions should we expect the process of alliance formation to stall, thereby making it less likely for sustainable mass protests to occur? First, to clarify the definition, an alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their objectives, where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political or economic) associated with violating the agreement.<sup>13</sup> At the most general level the chapter argues that an alliance between two opposition groups is likely to form when they provide each other with numbers—people to protest, strike, petition, etc.—and when they are

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<sup>13</sup> This definition is adapted from Fotini Christia's conception of an alliance between insurgent groups in civil wars (Christia 2012).

perceived to help reduce state repression or at least maintain it at the same level. Had repression remained lethal and indiscriminate, or had it continued to systematically subject large swaths of the population to torture, executions and disappearances, we would be less likely to observe the building of alliances between hundreds of civil society organizations. Without these coalitions efforts would have remained localized, atomized and even underground, without the possibility of large-scale public challenges.

These two conditions for alliance formation are based on the logic of how mass civil resistance campaigns succeed against repressive regimes: the priorities are recruiting as many participants as possible and reducing or maintaining repression to manageable levels.<sup>14</sup> Increasing the number of people participating in public actions reduces the likelihood that the average participant will be repressed, thus lowering fear among activists and individuals who have yet to join the movement. The reduced likelihood of getting repressed leads others to join the movement in a cascading effect (Kuran 1989, 1997). In addition, bigger actions are more likely to attract media attention, both nationally and internationally, which makes it more costly for the state to respond violently (McAdam 1990; Nepstad 2015; Wisler and Giugni 1999). Finally, another reason for civil society organizations to increase numbers through alliances is that the larger the mobilization, the more likely they are to achieve their political objectives (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). That said, smaller groups are also attractive as allies because

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<sup>14</sup> As described above, extremely high levels of repression preclude all mass public action and most public action with the exception of that around protector institutions. The type of mobilization that exists in those situations is predominantly underground. Moderate levels of repression toward most of the population can lead to medium-size and large protests. Opposition groups may not necessarily desire zero repression because they benefit from public outrage. In fact, there are cases where activists purposely generated state repression in order to get media attention and recruits (Morris 1986). However, in this case of a military dictatorship with a willingness to use extreme force, I would argue that in general activists desire a reduction in repression.

they increase the number of participants (however small the contribution), as long as they do not exacerbate repression.

On the other hand, from the perspective of civil society organizations there are also costs to a growing movement. First, the level of perceived threat from the part of the government is likely to surge with the number of people publicly opposing them. As a consequence, repression may increase toward those growing organizations, even if separately the groups had not attracted high levels of state violence prior to the alliance. Larger coalition of people is also less likely to be cohesive and disciplined, which can reduce their likelihood of success (Sharp et al. 2005).

Beyond numbers, the identity of the groups joining to publicly oppose the regime also matters for repression. Given the backdrop of the Cold War and the military junta's political project to eradicate Marxism from Chile, the most threatening joint actions would be those organized by Marxists and other leftists, especially those advocating for maximalist claims. Organizations taking up arms, or condoning the use of violence, would also be subject to higher levels of repression than those that were purely nonviolent. On the other hand, groups associated with the Catholic Church and other religious groups, international human rights organizations, to some extent the Christian Democratic Party, and the business elite would be less subject to repression and thus—all else being equal—constitute more desirable allies. The first hypothesis is thus that organizations whose militants suffer from targeted killings, torture, or forced disappearances are very unlikely to be part of alliances, despite the fact that they have enormous mobilizing potential (**Hypothesis 1**). More generally, the lower the repression that the regime is perpetrating against the opposition the more alliances we should observe (**Hypothesis 2**).

Given that alliance formation can lead to more repression for some reasons and to less repression for other reasons, a change in crackdown is very difficult to predict in any one

instance. It is the military junta, along with the security forces and their civilian counterparts (paramilitary groups), which weigh those factors—and others—to ultimately perpetrate state violence and nonviolent repression. Nonetheless, activists, thinking of which coalitions to build, make their own evaluations about what the state is likely to do in response to them taking joint public actions with other groups. While they may think of all the factors affecting repression mentioned above to make their own decisions, I find that that activists tend to use a proxy given the complexity of the repression-mobilization relationship (Interviewee 85, April 2016, Santiago, Chile). In particular, civil society organizations assume that they will suffer a similar level of repression as the group they are joining.

After an alliance is formed and the state responds, the coalition is maintained if repression stays the same or does not increase to unmanageable levels. In that case, it is likely that there will be further alliance formation with other groups. The alliance breaks, at least temporarily, if repression against the new coalition increases to include systematic executions, torture, and disappearances (i.e., unmanageable levels). Through this iterative process, mass movements emerge if repression is maintained at low to moderate levels because alliances continue to form between civil society organizations. In line with this idea, the third hypothesis is that if there is an alliance in time  $t$  and repression increases (to systematic executions, torture, and/or disappearances) in time  $t+1$ , we should no longer observe the alliance in time  $t+2$  (**Hypothesis 3**). This hypothesis is not testable with the large- $N$  dataset presented in this dataset, but is supported by the narrative derived from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports. More generally, the fourth hypothesis is that if repression is very severe, in terms of form, frequency and targeting, we should not observe mass mobilization (**Hypothesis 4**).

The pattern of state violence thus determines if public opposition groups will forge alliances, and it also shapes the alliances that emerge and make up the mass movement if it does consolidate. Even if an organization is able to provide a large number of participants, the state could broaden the targeting of extreme repression to make joining that group undesirable. The result of such an alliance would be demobilization or going underground to survive. Civil society organizations will make decisions about with whom to form an alliance based on how they perceive it impacting the level of repression that will result and the likelihood of them achieving success by increasing the number of participants.

For this iterative process to yield more alliances and lead to the consolidation of a mass movement, severe repression cannot be indiscriminate, or collectively or selectively target large segments of the population. These actions by the government lead to demobilization and atomization. Under indiscriminate violence individuals cannot properly evaluate the level of risk from engaging in civil society organizations, let alone find ones that are safe, because there is so much uncertainty. This uncertainty and fear leads individuals to avoid all forms of social and political gatherings. The first few months of the Pinochet dictatorship described above exhibited this pattern. The table below is an example of the pattern<sup>15</sup> of state repression for some groups in 1978, when the first alliances and medium-size public actions started taking place. The groups subject to collective torture and executions were not forming these alliances. Instead, coalitions started building between the relatives of the victims groups and labor unions, both of which had the protection of the Catholic Church, and college students.

<b>Target/ Form of repression</b>	<b>Disappearance</b> <sup>16</sup>	<b>Killing</b>	<b>Torture</b>	<b>Detained and released</b>	<b>Harassment</b>
Leftist political parties	Communist Party,	Communist		Leaders	

<sup>15</sup> (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017)

<sup>16</sup> One can assume that the person was abducted, tortured, killed, and their remains disappeared; therefore, disappearance is a crime that involves several forms of repression.

	Socialist Party, MIR <i>Frequent</i>	Party, Socialist Party, MIR <i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Rare</i> Average militant <i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Rare</i>
	MAPU, IC <i>Rare</i>	MAPU, IC <i>Rare</i>			
Armed groups	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	FPMR, Red September, GAP <i>Frequent</i>	<i>Very rare</i>	<i>Very rare</i>
Religious hierarchy	<i>Never</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Relatives of victims groups	<i>Never</i>	<i>Never</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Neighborhood associations	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>
Student groups	<i>Rare</i>	<i>Intermediate</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>	<i>Frequent</i>

One implication of this logic is that alliances will tend to form between organizations that suffer relatively similar patterns of state repression, which is another testable hypothesis (**Hypothesis 5**). The reason is that if there is inequality in repression, the one suffering from less repression will be hesitant to join a group subject to worse treatment because the state may respond in the same manner toward both. If there were coalitions among organizations suffering very different patterns of repression, I would expect the group with the lower level of repression to be working closely with protector institutions. The reason is that organizations that enjoy some level of protection from the Catholic Church, for example, are not very likely to be subject to the worst forms of violence because the cost for the government is too high. It is therefore no surprise that alliances in Chile started forming between the relatives of victims groups and organizations with slightly higher levels of repression, students, and with organizations with similar levels of repression, neighborhood associations. By 1981 there were a sufficient number of organizations suffering manageable levels of repression that mass mobilization consolidated.

The fact that territorial organizations were narrow in their objectives would not have been sufficient to avoid worse crackdowns. There are cases of the military junta cracking down on civil society organizations that were also far from demanding an end to the regime. For example, the secret reports show that the security forces would end plays and other cultural performances, and arrest the organizers, if they were mocking Pinochet, even mildly and implicitly. These actions reveal that the military junta was not naïve about seemingly apolitical or narrowly framed civil society organizations having the ambition to organize more broadly and for maximalist goals.

But even with a reduction in violence mobilization may not result in some cases. For example, hidden preferences and preference falsification (Kuran 1989, 1997) could account for a lack of mobilization even after a reduction in repression. While preference falsification may explain the lack of public resistance in certain places, it is less helpful in the case of Chile. The reasons are that armed forces forcibly deposed a democratically elected president who had a sizable backing from the population. *Unidad Popular* and the Allende regime were still fresh in Chileans minds after the coup and during the 18 years of military rule. The dictatorship did not last generations, which would make it harder for people to know through their own networks and experience other people's preferences. In addition, Chile did not become a totalitarian state, as was the Soviet Union, Kuran's main case study. There were numerous ways in which Chileans, at least privately, could express their views after the initial phase of indiscriminate and mass collective violence ended. Hundreds of civil society organizations flourished during the dictatorship, which were independent from the state, though the regime did try to co-opt many of them. These organizations served as sites where people connected and to some extent expressed their views with whom they trusted. The dissertation's argument is similar to Kuran's, however,

in the sense that it hinges on local and contextual factors, in my case on the form and frequency of repression that is perpetrated against specific targets.

Contrary to how alliance formation occurs in civil wars (Christia 2012), which is about building a “minimum winning coalition,” the logic of alliance formation in mass civil resistance campaigns is about building the largest possible movement. The idea behind the smallest winning coalition is that rebel groups want to win the war while reducing the number of groups with which to share power after regime change. Therefore, insurgents considering an alliance with a group also consider the potential ally's size, as a large disparity between the allies may mean the smaller group getting sidelined when distributing power in the post-conflict order. Civil society organizations are far less likely to consider the group's own gains in the post-conflict distribution of power when building alliances. The reason is that even if individual staff or volunteers of civil society organizations aspire to form part of the government upon a return to democracy, their organizational mission has nothing to do with running the country. One exception would be if political parties were the main actors building the mass movement. In that case, even though alliances still hinge on repression and numbers, parties are likely to consider their future in power as part of their alliance-building calculus. The counterfactual in this case would be: had political parties in Chile entered the fray of mass mobilization before protests consolidated, alliances would have been much more influenced by ideology and would have thus not been as expansive.

Other factors, such as ideological affinity and physical distance, may influence alliance formation among civil society organizations. But these are either secondary to repression and numbers, or they are endogenous to repression. Take ideology, for instance. I argue that ideology matters for alliance formation in two ways. First, as mentioned previously, organizations being

subject to low and moderate levels of repression will avoid collaborating with groups that are top targets of the regime, and ideology will partly determine which groups the regime considers its top enemies or threats (Staniland 2015). Second, ideology may also impact alliances through the protector institution (PI). As discussed in the chapter on the hydra effect, protector institutions are constrained in the organizations that they can lend support because they also have to stay in relatively acceptable terms with the regime. Given the importance of mobilization that emerges alongside protector institutions for the beginning of the process of alliance formation—indeed, PI-supported public actions are the first to challenge the Pinochet dictatorship—ideology has an indirect effect on alliance formation. In particular, the Catholic Church as the main protector institution in Chile had a policy of not assisting activists who had taken up arms against the regime. Building an alliance with an armed group, or a group that condoned the use of violence, for the Catholic Church in Chile was impossible. The sixth hypothesis is thus that protector institutions such as the Vicariate of Solidarity and other faith-based organizations should have the largest number of alliances (**Hypothesis 6**).

Given the imperative of numbers for sustaining mass mobilization, the fact that there is a common opponent in the military dictatorship, and that they are not looking to hold power after regime change, civil society organizations are unlikely to avoid alliances purely on the basis of ideological disagreements. Instead, they will articulate narrower positions, such as “family members should be able to know the whereabouts of their loved ones,” or thin and more general objectives such as ending the military junta and holding democratic elections. Political parties, on the other hand, will tend to behave more akin to insurgencies. The smallest winning coalition is attractive to organizations that expect to hold office if they succeed in deposing the regime. Political parties care about the reputation that they perpetuate through their alliances as they

launch into a political campaign following a successful mass movement. In addition, when the opposition spokespeople negotiate the details of the democratic transition, ideological differences become far more important. But as I describe above, the political parties that would in this case oppose the Pinochet dictatorship were subject to extreme repression, which forced them to stay underground. This meant that political parties did not take part in the initial alliance formation that consolidated mass mobilization in Chile in 1980. That said, while political parties would be more exclusionary in their alliances given their power ambitions, they would still not behave exactly as insurgencies in civil war because they are operating under the logic of mass mobilization, where numbers are of essence.

The resemblance of organizations may also facilitate alliance formation. All else being equal I would expect two labor unions to build an alliance more easily, for example, than a labor union and a student group. Similarly, an alliance between two organizations that are closer to each other in terms of physical distance—or that their leaders are within the same networks—would be easier to forge. Empirically I incorporate these factors with indicators in the dataset for group type and locality.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

Hundreds of major nonviolent and armed movements have developed against authoritarian governments in all corners of the world, and though most of them have faced state-led repression as a result, studies have found that nonviolent campaigns are more than twice as successful than armed insurgencies (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). These and other studies have also drawn important implications for post conflict peace and stability, as nonviolent transitions are correlated with less conflict recurrence, a reduction in violence, and

more durable democracy (Dudouet 2008; Karatnycky and Ackerman 2004). One of the cases on which these conclusions are based is the peaceful mass protest movement in the late 1980s that led to regime change in Chile. However, none of these studies even consider that there were at least four terrorist groups in Chile throughout the Pinochet dictatorship, including the FPMR with at least 1,500 soldiers. Rather than studying Chile as a single instance of a nonviolent movement that succeeded in countering repression and imparting peaceful change, the methods and data of this chapter are designed to show that the opposition to the military dictatorship was far more diverse. Importantly, it was not a given that the nonviolent side would gain the momentum it did and effectively prevent more widespread political violence.

Following recent work by Janet Lewis (2013, 2017) who examines rebel groups in the initial stages in Uganda and Kathleen Blee (2014) who investigates how grassroots activist groups emerge in Pittsburgh, I created a dataset that maps the observable universe of cases of opposition to the military dictatorship in Chile's Metropolitan Region (*Región Metropolitana*). An opposition group in this study is an association of individuals, regardless of its size and how formal or informal it is, that had, at some point during the Pinochet dictatorship (from September 11, 1973 and the plebiscite in 1988), the goal of opposing the military government directly or indirectly. Opposition organizations in this dataset employ armed, nonviolent or mixed strategies. The goals encompassed are either reformist, such as changing economic, political and/or social government policies, or maximalist, such as regime change. Given these criteria the study includes a broad set of actor, such as banned political parties, faith-based organizations, labor unions, student and professional associations, victims' groups, art and cultural resistance groups, human rights and women's rights NGOs, neighborhood associations and territorially-based groups, armed groups, and protest command groups.

The main empirical challenge of this chapter is thus to include the negative cases of mobilization, namely those that failed to consolidate or pose a threat to the military junta. Given their size, these groups are very difficult to observe. The press does not report on public gatherings of 20 people to protest a government policy, for example, or on a group of students walking out of their classrooms to protest the military junta's takeover of the university. One can also not rely on how the media characterizes the social mobilization that they do cover given the authoritarian nature of the regime. In Chile, as is common in other autocratic contexts, the press was not allowed to operate freely. The junta closed down media outlets for reporting on government repression and the opposition, such as was the case with Radio Chilena (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1977). In order to find as many emerging grassroots efforts as possible, I use a combination of primary and secondary sources, as well as personal interviews with leaders of opposition groups. Among the sources used to locate opposition groups are:

1. The Vicariate of Solidarity, which was part of Chile's Catholic Church and by far the most important organization "measuring the pulse" of the country and recording abuses, left an invaluable archive in Santiago (*Fundación Documentación y Archivo de la Vicaría de la Solidaridad, Arzobispado de Santiago*). This organization produced during the dictatorship the three most important sources that this study uses to identify opposition groups, containing tens of thousands of pages: All the issues from their biweekly magazine *Solidaridad*; their secret monthly reports (*Informes Mensuales*); and the boxes with materials on peasants, *pobladores* (people living in shantytowns), and students.
2. Reports, pamphlets, and other documents from groups categorized as "social organizations" in the National Archive of Chile, 20th Century records, during the period of the dictatorship (1973-1989).
3. Publications by the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEPU), a major human rights organization, found at the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago.
4. The official reports from Chile's three truth commissions: Rettig (The National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation in 1991), Valech I (The National Commission on

Political Imprisonment and Torture Report in 2004), and Valech II (The National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture Report in 2011).

5. The collection of U.S.-Chile documents from the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, which includes declassified U.S. government documents from the FBI, CIA, and State Department.
6. Secondary sources, including Ph.D. dissertations, books, articles, and reports.

This process resulted in a dataset of 1,685 opposition groups that operated in the Metropolitan Region between 1973 and 1989. Coding yearly observations of all these cases, and for all the organizational and repression indicators, was prohibitively time consuming. In order to make the study tractable, I (along with Peter Aronow and Fredrik Savje) developed a method of case selection that combines advantages from qualitative case knowledge and random selection (Amat et al. Working Paper). This technique has the benefits of random sampling—namely, avoiding bias, promoting representativeness, and being able to recover the probability population mean—and the benefits of purposive case selection—namely, harnessing in depth knowledge about cases and not leaving it up to chance to exclude extremely important cases that are needed to understand the phenomenon of interest. The key is that in the end all 1,685 organizations will have a non-zero probability of selection—some will be sampled with 100 percent probability and the rest will have a range of probabilities of being selected through the stratified random sampling.<sup>17</sup>

The first step consists of selecting opposition groups that need to be included in the study because of their importance—these are the “must-do” cases. Organizations that provide a significant amount of information about how the opposition emerged and consolidated in Chile in an environment of repression are to be included in the study with certainty. In other words,

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<sup>17</sup> The Horowitz-Thompson continues being an unbiased estimator of the population mean with unequal probabilities.

these are the opposition groups that are most likely to update our priors, per the Bayesian worldview (Humphreys and Jacobs 2015). One can also not afford leaving it up to chance to exclude these groups from the study because of practical reasons. People with any knowledge of Chile's history are very likely to know something about the must-do cases. Including them in the study allows readers to engage with the research in a more meaningful way. Regardless of whether this chapter's propositions comport or challenge common knowledge on these cases, people will be more equipped to assess the work if it includes the must-do cases. The research design in this chapter, which aims to overcome the selection problem of exclusively studying large-scale mobilization, means that many of the groups in the dataset will likely be small and obscure. Other than including the must-do organizations, the case selection method involves stratified random sampling, which does not ensure that well-known cases of general interest will be incorporated.

In order to select the must-do cases I consulted with three of the most important scholars of the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile: Psychology Professor Elizabeth Lira of Universidad Alberto Hurtado who served as one of the eight members heading the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, and was also a member of the team consulted to create the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago; History Professor Mario Garcés of Universidad de Santiago de Chile; and History Professor Cristina Moyano of Universidad de Santiago de Chile. I provided my working definition of opposition group, given how broad it is, and asked them to make a list of the most important such groups that existed during the Pinochet dictatorship. Specifically, I asked them to make a list the most important groups according to criteria such as the level of state repression that they endured, how well they evaded repression, and how impactful they were in the resistance against the dictatorship and in the process of

achieving democracy. Other less important factors that I asked them to consider included the opposition group's size, as well as level of internal cohesion and formalization (see Appendix A for a copy of the email that I sent to these three professors). I also independently made a list of the cases that I thought should be included with 100 percent probability based on my case knowledge. The final list of 12 must-do cases emerged from including all the groups that the professors recommended, except for the think tanks that Professor Moyano suggested given that I do not include those types of organizations in the study. There was significant overlap between our lists. Mine only had three groups that were not in either of the professors' lists and I included one of those, namely the Movement Against Torture Sebastián Acevedo. I incorporated this group based on my interviews, which revealed its uniqueness as a resistance group and influence on other opposition movements. The final list of must-do cases is:

1. Vicariate of Solidarity
2. Communist Party of Chile
3. Socialist Party of Chile
4. Christian Democratic Party
5. MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement)
6. Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR)
7. Association of Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared (AFDD)
8. Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEPU)
9. The Social Aid Foundation of Christian Churches (FASIC)
10. Committee for the Cooperation of Peace in Chile (COPACHI)
11. Chilean Human Rights Commission
12. Movement against Torture Sebastián Acevedo

The second part of the selection process consists of defining the variables on which to stratify, coding the stratifying variables for all 1,685 cases, and conducting the stratified random sampling without replacement. The variables on which I stratify all cases are the most basic indicators: a binary indicator for whether the organization was founded before or after the coup of September 11, 1973, and a categorical variable for the type of organization, which could be banned political parties, faith-based organizations, labor unions, student and professional

associations, victims’ groups, art and cultural resistance groups, human rights and women’s rights NGOs, neighborhood associations and territorially-based groups, armed groups, or protest command groups. Then there are two types of organizations that are further stratified, the labor unions by industry (primary, secondary, tertiary or multi-industry coalition) and the territorially-based groups by geographic location (North, East, West, South and Central Santiago; the other provinces making up the Metropolitan Region, namely Chacabuco, Cordillera, Maipo, Melipilla, and Talagante, and coordinating organizations).<sup>18</sup> Table 1 shows the distribution of cases across all strata. In parenthesis is the number of must-do cases. For example, 4 of the 14 political parties that emerged before the coup that deposed President Salvador Allende are must-do cases and thus have a 100 percent probability of being sampled.

**Table 1:** Distribution of Opposition Groups by Type and Date of Founding

<i>Type/ Group formed before or after coup</i>	Pre-coup	Post-coup
Political party	14 (4)	34
Union/workers org	495	62
Religious	33	39 (3)
Human rights NGO	5	21 (2)
Professionals	41	55
Students	58	42
Women’s groups/ feminists	1	18
Victims’ groups/ denunciation orgs	1	16 (1)
Armed groups	0	9 (1)
Shantytown orgs/ neighborhood associations	22	148
Art/ cultural orgs	7	63
Informal protest group/ protest command	2	52 (1)

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<sup>18</sup> In this study, however, I do not use these last two sub-categories for unions and geographic location to conduct the random sampling because the sampling scheme would have resulted in too many cases to code.

After coding these variables for the 1,685 groups, I sample all strata with an equal probability of 15 percent. In addition, I set a maximum and a minimum number of cases that can be sampled from each cell in order to control the size of the final dataset and to make sure that we gain enough information from the less populated cells. At least 10 opposition groups are selected from each cell and if the cell has fewer than 10 cases, they are all selected. The maximum is 40 cases per cell. The max-min makes sure that there will not be that many labor unions in the dataset or too few cases in cells with less than 10 cases. The total number of groups in Table 1 is 1,250 rather than 1,685 because of missing data. There are 435 cases for which I could not code the type or founding moment with certainty and 15 percent of those missing data cases will be selected to code more in depth. After implementing the sampling scheme outlined above the dataset has a total of 328 cases (236 observations selected through stratified random sampling + 12 must-do cases + 80 randomly selected cases from missing data). Appendix B shows the list of selected cases through stratified random sampling and the 12 must-do organizations.<sup>19</sup>

The dataset of 328 cases is time-series (at the opposition group-year level) and it includes all the years of the Pinochet dictatorship, 1973 to 1989. It therefore has 5,904 observations. A series of variables are coded to conduct statistical analysis of the main relationship of interest, the effect of repression on alliances, with control variables to address omitted variable bias as much as possible and to disconfirm alternative hypotheses. Factors such as the segment of society from where the opposition group's leadership and first-movers came, the level of resources, foreign support, indicators for internal cohesion, organizational structure, political objectives, and strategy, are included. Mobilization is not one of the variables, though it would

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<sup>19</sup> The 80 cases with missing data will be selected and coded after the rest of the dataset is finished.

ideally be included in the dataset to model it as one of the dependent variables. The reason is that it would be extremely difficult to find group-year information about participation in protests. Instead, the number of alliances is the main dependent variable and a series of repression variables the explanatory factors. The years when mass mobilization occurred are highlighted in the descriptive statistics graphs in order to observe how they overlap with an increase in alliances. In addition, the chapter shows how alliances and mass mobilization track together by leveraging qualitative evidence from the Vicariate of Solidarity's archive. See Appendix C for the complete list of variables and codebook.

In terms of the limits to the dataset, there are three important ones to point out. First and foremost, there is still missing data given how small and obscure some of the groups are. Organizations for which we (my research assistants and I) cannot find written records require personal interviews with individuals from the area where the group was active. I am confident that we will be able to have a much smaller percentage of missing data as we conduct more interviews. Second, I can of course not be sure that it contains all opposition groups that existed, and given how small some of the cases are, it is likely that the dataset does not in fact contain them all. Nonetheless, this dataset provides a remarkably wide view at the full range of opposition and their origins in Chile, and it gets us closer to overcoming the selection problem of studying mostly major movements. Third, the dataset does not contain information about the participation of groups in protests by year. Therefore, the chapter does not have mass mobilization as its dependent variable in the quantitative analysis. Rather, the main dependent variable in the quantitative analysis is number of alliances and the independent variable is repression. Qualitative evidence, in particular from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports, is provided to show how alliance formation leads to mass mobilization.

The opposition groups dataset provides a rich picture of the constellation of resistance that existed in the most populated state in Chile (and beyond, as many of them had a presence outside this region), their origins, and variation across time on how their objectives, tactics, formalization, cohesion, and alliances changed alongside government repression. The dataset does not, however, inform us about the progression from acquiescence or underground resistance to public action—how and when the opposition went public and a mass movement consolidated. The first chapter of the dissertation examines the underground resistance that a segment of the opposition was waging against the Pinochet dictatorship, and the second chapter analyzes the type of opposition group that conducted the first public protests against the regime, which were a direct result of the repression. This chapter traces the first signs of public opposition all the way to the start of mass mobilization in the early 1980s by going through every monthly secret report (*Informes Mensuales*) that the Vicariate of Solidarity produced from their founding in 1976 to the end of the dictatorship in 1989. In these reports the Vicariate of Solidarity documented repression in great detail, with individual testimonies, statistics, and evaluations of the patterns of repression that month. In addition, these reports also record public expressions of dissent that they could identify, including some instances of individual resistance; public statements from elites, unions, the international community, and others; strikes; hunger strikes; small protests; and major protests.

These archives provide a very detailed view of how public resistance emerged in the Metropolitan Region, and they show the iterative process of alliance formation with repression at the center. While these reports are an invaluable resource, and I am confident that they contain the most accurate and complete account of public opposition in the Metropolitan Region that is publicly available, there may be some actions that are excluded. First and foremost, the Vicariate

of Solidarity was founded—and started these reports—in 1976; therefore, actions between the last months of 1973 through the end of 1975 are missing. The first reports in 1976 provide an overview of what had been occurring in the country since the coup, but the information is nowhere near the level of detail of contemporaneous events.

Second, the Vicariate of Solidarity was primarily concerned with documenting state repression; therefore, actions that were not punished in any way (not even resulting in a layoff, a few hours of detention, or a home search) are unlikely to be included in these reports. That said it is probably safe to assume that any public action critical of the military junta, no matter how subdued, resulted in some level of state repression, at least during the first few years of the dictatorship. Two examples of the types of actions that resulted in state repression in the 1970s are illustrative. The August 1978 secret report documents that unemployed individuals organized a show of Folkloric music in order to raise funds to subsist and yet the main organizer was detained. The same report mentions the case of a woman who yelled at Pinochet's motorcade as it was passing through a *población* and she was detained, questioned, and mistreated. But already by the early 1980s state authorities were preoccupied with large protests and thus potentially less likely to respond to small acts of resistance, even if they existed at all. In short, since the Vicariate of Solidarity was documenting virtually all instances of repression and the military junta likely repressed all acts of public opposition, the secret reports should not underreport certain types of public opposition (namely those that did not result in some form of state repression).

But even if the public display of opposition did not result in state repression, the secret reports should include those actions too as long as the organizers and/or participants are somehow connected to the Catholic Church. Being connected to the Catholic Church in this case

is not too restrictive, however. As explained in chapter 2, the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity had immense reach in society during this period of repression and need. The institution had projects in poor neighborhoods (*poblaciones*); protected and served victims, their relatives, and their advocacy groups; and worked on behalf of peasants for their plight, particularly as the economy worsened starting in 1977. The work of the *Pastoral Obrera*, which was the Vicariate of Solidarity's department for workers, covered the needs of the industrial sector and labor unions. Hence, the Catholic Church had a deep connection to almost all segments of society that could attempt to oppose the regime.

When it came to individuals using armed action, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez and the Vicariate of Solidarity drew a red line (Cavallo 1991). Most certainly to prevent the military junta from closing down the Vicariate of Solidarity, the institution's policy was that perpetrators of what they called "crimes of blood" (*crímenes de sangre*) would not be protected or assisted by the Catholic hierarchy (Cavallo 1991; Hau 2005). As a result, victims from the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez and MIR members who had been engaging in armed action were usually not assisted by the Vicariate of Solidarity.<sup>20</sup> While this policy may have allowed the Vicariate of Solidarity to operate during the years of the dictatorship, it did not prevent the military junta, especially via newspapers sympathetic to the regime, from slandering the Vicariate of Solidarity, bishops, and even the Cardinal. Dozens of pages from the May to October 1977 secret reports are dedicated to outlining all the accusations leveled against the Catholic hierarchy, as well as to pasting the various articles from *El Mercurio* and the recurrent (almost identical) "letters to the

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<sup>20</sup> CODEPU was founded in order to fill this gap left by the Vicariate of Solidarity. They provided legal and other assistance to victims of torture, families of victims, and others connected to armed action. Lay people and a nun who was part of MIR's Central Committee, Blanca Rengifo, founded CODEPU. CODEPU leaders and members suffered far more repression than those from the Vicariate of Solidarity, including detention, torture, sexual abuse in prison, and the burning of their premises (Interviewee 34, Santiago de Chile, April 2016).

editor” expressing concerns about the Catholic Church. The most common accusations were that the Cardinal, bishops, and priests were aiding and abetting Marxists and “terrorists.”

The other segments of society that were more disconnected from the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity were students, though not entirely. There were some exceptions with regards to after-school programs that the Church organized for those in need, as well as with the outreach of the Vicariate of Solidarity's department for the youth called *Vicaria Pastoral Juvenil*. Perhaps given its emphasis on the most in need during this period, the Catholic Church and the Vicariate of Solidarity did not focus on professional associations and universities as much. Finally, women's rights and LGBTQ rights groups did not find a natural ally in the Catholic Church given the latter's conservative stance on those issues.

In addition to the time restriction of these reports, and the bias toward documenting actions that led to repression and actions organized by people connected to the Catholic Church, distortions can be introduced depending on the source. These secret reports sometimes mention public acts of resistance that the Vicariate of Solidarity only learned through newspaper reports from *El Mercurio* or from military junta statements. I exclude those actions because the government may have fabricated them to justify repression. For example, a tactic that the military junta adopted to justify killing its political opponents was to say that they had detained them, but they had to shoot them in the back because they tried to escape (Rettig 1991; Fruhling 1983, 1984). The government also fabricated “armed encounters” with militants, saying that the police or armed forces had responded with lethal force in self-defense. The Vicariate of Solidarity started learning about these practices even during the dictatorship, as the actual victims of the violence or their family members came to them with competing accounts of the


events. The reports also show the government's own contradictory statements on the same incident, thereby questioning their credibility.

Having described the dataset of opposition groups, as well as the archives on which I rely to identify the emergence of public resistance in the Metropolitan Region, the next section presents the descriptive statistics and analysis from the dataset. I present evidence for the five hypotheses outlined above.

## **FINDINGS**

The Opposition Groups in the Metropolitan Region (OGMC) dataset has nine binary indicators for repression, which are these chapter's main explanatory variables. They indicate whether or not an opposition group, on any given year, suffered at least one disappearance, execution, case of torture, detention, forcible displacement, raid, forced exile, politicized layoff, or harassment. In order to view and analyze the data, I indexed the violent repression indicators and the nonviolent repression indicators separately. Violent repression is the addition of the binary variables of disappearance, execution and torture for each group-year. For example, if a group in 1973 had at least one case of execution and one case of torture, but no disappearances, the violent repression variable score is 2. Similarly, nonviolent repression is the addition of the binary variables of detention, forcible displacement, raid, forced exile, politicized layoff, or harassment for each group-year. Figure 1 shows the mean level of the index violent repression variable, as well as the mean level of the nonviolent repression variable, toward all opposition groups in the dataset by year. While the average level of violent repression steadily decreases, with the exception of a few spikes during mass protests in the 1980s, mean nonviolent repression remains relatively high and dramatically increases in the early 1980s.

**Figure 1:** Average Level of Nonviolent and Violent Repression toward All Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset, 1973-1990




Note: The shaded area represents periods of mass national protests, including the first one during the Pinochet dictatorship, from 1983 to 1986. The protests in 1988 were around the October 5 national plebiscite that ended the Pinochet dictatorship.

Generally consistent with this chapter's main hypothesis (Hypothesis 2 and 4), Figure 1 and Figure 2 together show that the lower the repression that the regime is perpetrating against the opposition the more alliances we observe, and that mass mobilization does not occur when violent repression is the highest. These graphs are suggestive evidence that as *violent* repression in particular goes down—and not necessarily nonviolent repression—the alliances between opposition groups will increase. Also congruent with the idea that mass protests require alliances between opposition groups, alliances peaked during the mass protests that changed the course of the Pinochet dictatorship from 1983 to 1986. By the end of 1986, the frequent mass protests calling for the overthrow of the regime had subsided, and instead the proposal of waiting for the

Constitutional 1988 plebiscite took hold. The mass protests that followed were around the electoral campaign, to bring awareness for the October 5 vote, and to make sure that the government would hold free and fair elections and respect the results.

It is important to note that the rise in mass protests was not abrupt as Figures 1 and 2 suggest. Medium-size protests started occurring more frequently, followed by sporadic larger protests, and then larger more frequent protests, and so forth. This increase in mobilization should track more closely with the rise in alliances. Unfortunately, the OGMC dataset does not contain mobilization variables by opposition group-year. It would be extremely difficult to find information about whether or not each group participated in a given protest. Even though this dataset cannot show the slow rise in public mobilization, tracking more closely with alliances, the narrative from the Vicariate of Solidarity confidential reports is meant to fill this gap. It shows how in reality mass mobilization emerged slowly through this process of alliance formation.

**Figure 2:** Average Number of Alliances of all Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset by Year, 1973-1990




Note: The shaded area represents periods of mass national protests, including the first one during the Pinochet dictatorship, from 1983 to 1986. The protests in 1988 were around the October 5 national plebiscite that ended the Pinochet dictatorship.

After disaggregating violent repression and alliances by type of opposition group, Figures 3 and 4 show that political parties, armed groups, as well as student and professional associations, were the victims of the highest levels of violent repression. These descriptive statistics are largely consistent with the findings of the 1991 National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report (otherwise known as the Rettig report). The political parties in opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship were primarily from the left, with the exception of the Christian Democratic Party, which is centrist. The top targets of the Pinochet dictatorship were these leftist and ultra-leftist political movements, which reflects that the highest level of violent repression was directed toward them. Surprisingly, unions do not appear to have been subjected to such high levels of violent repression. Three reasons may explain the observed pattern. First, many of the labor union leaders who were disappeared and executed were also leftist party militants, and

the repression is thus counted under political parties. Another reason is that labor unions faced very high levels of nonviolent repression and legal restrictions, which might have replaced some of the violent repression. They were subjected to extensive mass layoffs of people believed to be associated with leftist parties, detentions of labor union leaders, and the stripping of the union's right to collectively bargain and strike. Finally, the organizing that unions did during the dictatorship did not happen in the workplace as much as in Catholic parishes and under the protection of the religious leadership (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, 1977-1981; Araya 2015). This relationship contrasts with that of political parties. Leftist political party militants went underground to continue organizing and they did so largely without the protection of the Catholic Church.

**Figure 3:** Average Level of Violent Repression by Opposition Group, 1973-1990




N=2,107

Figure 4 is also generally consistent with this chapter's expectations about the number of alliances and the level of violent repression that the types of opposition groups faced (the higher the violent repression the fewer the alliances). Protest groups had the highest number of

alliances, as well as human rights NGOs, victims' organizations, and women's groups. However, political parties have an unexpectedly high average number of alliances given the level of violent repression that they experienced. This may be because the number of alliances that political parties forged skyrocketed shortly after violent repression decreased, pushing the average up from the early 1980s on. The network graphs below illustrate this dramatic change. In addition, the Christian Democratic Party was not the subject of such high levels of violent repression; therefore, its ties during the entire period of the dictatorship pull the average of alliances for political parties up as well.

**Figure 4:** Average Number of Alliances by Opposition Group, 1973-1990



The following figure provides evidence for the first hypothesis, which is that organizations whose militants suffer from targeted killings, torture, and/or forced disappearances are very unlikely to be part of alliances, despite the fact that they have enormous mobilizing


potential (Hypothesis 1). Figure 5 is the representation of all alliances between and among the types of opposition group in 1973, the year that the Chilean Armed Forces deposed Allende and established a military junta. The color of the nodes or vertices represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). Finally, the thickness of the links represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line connecting the two.

The first thing to note is that, as expected, most opposition groups faced high levels of violent repression the year that the military junta consolidated power following the successful coup. Consistent with this chapter's hypotheses about repression and alliances, there were very few alliances between opposition groups at this stage, with the exception of groups building ties with protector institutions (religious groups and human rights NGOs). In 1973 the thickest alliances were between groups of the religious type and neighborhood associations (primarily in *poblaciones* or shantytowns), which faced occupations by the Armed Forces, as well as frequent raids and detentions followed by disappearances, as the Armed Forces searched for leftist party militants. The Vicariate of Solidarity and Catholic parishes in those communities became highly involved to assuage the pain of the repression. This observation is also consistent with this chapter's sixth hypothesis, which contends that protector institutions such as the Vicariate of

Solidarity and other faith-based organizations should have the largest number of alliances (Hypothesis 6).

It is also important to note that nearly half of all types of groups did not have a single alliance among organizations of their same type. As I describe in the narrative above about the stages of repression and alliances, derived from the Vicariate of Solidarity's confidential reports, civil society became atomized during the phase of widespread, and largely indiscriminate, violent repression. My main contention in this chapter is that under this environment of high repression it is not possible that we will observe mass protests. The same regime, however, changes the pattern of violence against civil society and ties begin to grow, making mass protests possible and likely in Chile given the context described above.

**Figure 5:** Alliances in 1973 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset




Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The

shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line connecting the two.

Figure 6 illustrating the alliances in 1977 contrasts with Figure 7, which depicts the 1978 alliances. The crucial changes that occurred from 1977 to 1978 are that the secret police DINA was dissolved (1977), disappearances as a systematic form of repression perpetrated by the regime against the opposition ended (also 1977), and violent repression generally saw a precipitous drop during this period (as seen in Figure 1). One can observe that the number of alliances increased and that only armed groups suffered a high level of repression by 1978. Political parties experienced a medium level of violent repression, and they began forming alliances with diverse types of opposition groups. In addition, by 1978 most opposition groups have ties with organizations within their same type (square nodes), and there are increasingly thicker links between different types of opposition organizations.

**Figure 6:** Alliances in 1977 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset






Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line connecting the two.

These network graphs are also consistent with the fifth hypothesis, which derives from the logic of alliance formation. Alliances will tend to form between organizations that suffer relatively similar patterns of state repression (Hypothesis 5). Indeed, most of the ties in these figures are between types of groups that have the same (low) level of repression (represented by the yellow vertices). Appendix D contains all the years not displayed in the body of the chapter. Further, Figure 8 shows the dramatic increase in ties between types of opposition groups that exist when the first mass national protests against Pinochet start in 1983. The number of ties is significantly larger compared to what we have seen up until this point, and especially between

1973 and 1977. The social fabric (*tejido social*) of Chilean civil society is reconstructed during this period, and mass protests become possible (Bustamante Olguín 2010).

**Figure 8:** Alliances in 1983 Between and Among Types of Opposition Groups in the OGMC Dataset



Note: The color of the nodes represents an ordinal variable for the average level of violent repression against the type of opposition group (red being high, blue being medium, and yellow being low). The shape of the nodes reflects whether or not the groups within each type had alliances among themselves. The square represents a type of opposition group that had ties among themselves (e.g., there was at least one alliance between two unions). The circle represents that there was not even one alliance among organizations of the same type (e.g., there were no ties among unions). The thickness of the ties represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line connecting the two.

During the 1988 mass protests one also observes a highly inter- and intra-connected landscape of civil society, spanning across political parties, labor unions, student groups, etc. Armed groups are still relatively isolated, as the hypotheses in this chapter would predict, with a few exceptions. There is one tie between a human rights NGO and an armed group, which is the relationship between CODEPU and the Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR). As I describe



represents the density of the alliance between the two types of opposition groups: the higher the number of alliances between organizations of the two types of groups the thicker the line connecting the two.

## **Hypothesis Testing**

Finally, I test the main hypotheses of this chapter in fixed effects models (to account for the panel data) with key covariates and different specifications. In addition to testing the simplest form of the relationship with one independent variable (violent repression) and the main dependent variable (average number of alliances by year), I include two main confounders, namely ideology and the primary political objective of the opposition group. These two variables are potential confounders because they are likely associated with both the number of alliances and the level of repression to which groups are subjected. Ideology is an ordinal-level variable that describes the ideology of opposition groups as centrist, leftist, or ultra-leftist. The more radical the group ideological, the idea would be that they would be more likely to be repressed, and thus have fewer alliances. With respect to the primary objective of the opposition group, this is an ordinal-level variable that describes whether the organization had reformist or more maximalist objectives on any given year (see the Codebook in Appendix C for the details). The expected relationship here would be that the more extreme the objective the higher the likelihood of suffering violent repression, and the fewer alliances the group would have. Ideally, mobilization would be tested as the dependent variable in another model; however, as mentioned previously, the OGMC dataset does not contain specific participation information by group-year.

Importantly, I find that after including these two covariates the negative relationship between violent repression and the average number of alliances becomes more substantive (a larger coefficient). All the coefficients for violent repression are statistically significant, and show that higher violent repression is associated with a lower number of alliances, regardless of the specification.

The six fixed effects models tested in this chapter are as follows:


1. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + e_{it}$
2. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + e_{it}$
3. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Violent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + b_3 \text{Objective}_{it} + e_{it}$
4. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + e_{it}$
5. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + e_{it}$
6. Average Number of Alliances  $_{it} = a_{it} + b_1 \text{Nonviolent Repression}_{it} + b_2 \text{Ideology}_{it} + b_3 \text{Objective}_{it} + e_{it}$

(where  $i$  is each organization and  $t$  is each year from 1973-1990)

Figure 10 is the coefficients plot with the results from these models. The hollow symbols are the models with violent repression as the main explanatory variable, and the filled symbols are the coefficients of the models with nonviolent repression as the main independent variable. A change from an organization not suffering any form of violent repression to experiencing at least one disappearance, execution, or case of torture is associated with a reduction in the average number of alliances by approximately half of a tie, controlling for the ideology and primary objective of the opposition group. Considering that the average number of alliances for an organization in the OGMC dataset is 2.5, half of a tie is a substantively important change. Interestingly, the nonviolent repression coefficients show the opposite relationship, which is that the higher the level of *nonviolent* repression the higher the average number of alliances by year. Though not anticipated by the theory in this chapter, perhaps this is the case because when repression is manageable, civil society is able to act publicly to defend itself and pursue its political objectives, which require the forging of alliances.

Though some of the coefficients of the covariates are statistically insignificant at the  $p < .05$  level, they have the expected direction: the more radical the ideology and the more extreme the objective of the group, the lower the average of alliances by year.

**Figure 10:** The Effect of Violent and Nonviolent Repression on the Average Number of Alliances by Year Between and Among Opposition Groups in the OGMC dataset, 1973-1990



All fixed effects models at the year-group level

### Alternative Explanations and Implications

The theory and analysis on alliance formation leaves a few open questions. First, if the regime is observing a rise in ties between organizations, and the slow increase in frequency and size of public actions, why does not repression increase? Why did not the military junta respond with sufficient force to prevent these alliances from forming and disrupt mass mobilization? There are two main reasons why there were more limits to repression after 1977. The secret police DINA had been dissolved in 1977 due to international pressure, particularly from the United States

President Jimmy Carter. The relatives of the disappeared, who had been organizing and gaining media attention domestically and internationally, also pressured the regime to end this form of repression.<sup>21</sup> In other words, extreme repression, such as the systematic torture, execution and disappearance of leftist party militants, became very politically costly for the military junta. The Vicariate of Solidary secret reports show that Pinochet was concerned about his image in Latin America (represented by the Organization of American States), the United States and the United Nations, which were all exerting pressure for improved human rights in Chile. The fact that the junta led a libelous propaganda campaign against the Catholic Church, which greatly intensified after Cardinal Silva Henríquez met with OAS spokespeople about the human rights situation, shows that Pinochet was concerned about the international community shaming and isolating his government (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, September 1978). For economic, political, and social reasons, the United States and Western institutions had leverage on the Pinochet regime (Levitsky and Way 2010).

In addition, part of the reason why repression was not so extreme against the groups that started building alliances with a potential to consolidate a mass movement—shantytown associations and to some extent labor unions—is that their mobilization occurred at a time when the poor in Chile were suffering greatly. The economic crisis may have caused the regime to have information problems about the nature of the mobilization: these groups could credibly signal that they were only concerned with the regime's economic policies and that they did not have greater ambitions to depose the military government (Debs and Monteiro 2014; Weiss 2014). Civil society organizations focused on subsistence were also useful to the government

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<sup>21</sup> Following the DINA's assassination of Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. Orlando Letelier and his assistant Roni Moffitt in a car bomb in Washington, DC, the United States pressured Pinochet to reign in DINA and its extreme human rights abuses (Kornbluh 2013).

because they alleviated the grievances of the poor. Soup kitchens and programs to help the unemployed were genuinely concerned with improving the lives of those most affected by the crisis. Alliances grew until they were massive without unmanageable levels of violence, and then they started making maximalist demands.

Another question that remains unanswered after this analysis has to do with competition between opposition organizations. Work on social movements has pointed to competition among opposition groups, particularly for members, funding, and political attention, leading to innovation in tactics and to changes in strategy (Soule and King 2008; Zald and McCarthy 1979). This research suggests that alliances between civil society organizations may not primarily be a function of violent repression, but instead of competition among opposition groups (McGroary 2018). I find that competition among groups was not an important factor determining alliances prior to the protests. Instead, political competition became much more salient once the military junta started negotiating an exit and certain organizations were excluded from those talks. Once the movement became more electorally driven and focused on the plebiscite, the opposition became more divided. During this time political parties took the lead and became more prominent in the public opposition against the regime than they had been up until this point. In fact, most of the work by political parties from 1973 to 1979 happened underground or abroad because of the very high levels of violent repression. But as soon as the mass national protests started, and the military junta opened the possibility for a transition, political parties emerged to seize the opportunity. The prospect for negotiations led to infighting, however.

During the height of the protests there were two distinct groups that political parties formed, which had this ideological and strategic divide. The Democratic Alliance (*Alianza*

*Democrática*), which represented more moderate leftists and the Democratic Popular Movement (*Movimiento Democrático Popular*), which coordinated the more radical leftist political parties, both from 1983 to 1987. By 1986, the military junta was pressured into accepting going to negotiations, at which point they chose to do so with the moderates, empowering the Democratic Alliance and excluding the Democratic Popular Movement (Ortega Frei 1992). The Communist Party and MIR, which had not repudiated the use of force to overthrow the regime, did not play a major role during the transition despite their considerable membership base. The imperative of winning the national plebiscite did not prevent these divisions among leftists, though the Communists and other more radical leftists would vote for the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*) instead of provide support to Pinochet and the military junta. The Median voter theorem operates in this case, leading more extreme leftists to choose the option that is closest to their view even if they are not directly included.

The proliferation of civil society organizations that occurs after the coup in 1973 is thus not a consequence or symptom of competition, but rather of the repression and economic crisis. Violent repression atomized the population and the public organizing that happened, for subsistence purposes or to cope with repression, took place at the very local level. This led to the emergence of hundreds of civil society groups during the height of the repression, which seems counterintuitive. During this period, ideological differences and competition for funding, for example, became far less important than during times of relative peace. Civil society had a very clear common opponent—Pinochet and the military junta—and the challenges were so vast that they required a concerted and united effort (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, August 1977).

Nonetheless, this chapter takes into consideration the process of differentiation that occurs during the mass protests, by including the type “protest groups” as opposition organizations, which are essentially these coalitions of mainly political parties that formed around the protests. In addition, by controlling for ideology and political objective, the parametric models described above account for the most important differences between these groups leading to competition. The process of alliance formation nonetheless takes place and a reduction in violent repression is strongly related to it.

On implications, this chapter's theoretical framework and empirical strategy are helpful to make sense of findings in the literature on mass mobilization. They may also shed light on the puzzling and contradictory work that we have seen on the relationship between repression and collective action. First, on the civil resistance literature, cross-national studies usually include country-level measures of repression, which hopefully measure crackdowns against protesters, though sometimes it is unclear who the target of the repression is that is being measured. These studies have found that repression reduces the probability of success of nonviolent movements by an astounding 45 percent. Instead of theorizing on the relationship between repression, mass mobilization, and the success of civil resistance campaigns, these cross-national studies simply “control” for repression in order to show that the relationship between strategy (nonviolent vs. violent) and success rate holds (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 2008). The chapter's theory, on the other hand, puts repression at the center of mass mobilization and makes sense of this empirical pattern. As mentioned previously, when repression reaches very high levels (in terms of frequency and form) against the groups that are protesting, the alliances that had formed and produced mass public actions will likely wither. As alliances get destroyed, the continuation of the mass movement becomes less likely.

Furthermore, the datasets on which these studies are based only include civil resistance campaigns that have already mobilized tens of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of people. They have all proven to be organizationally successful, at least at a given point in time. This dissertation has argued that organizationally successful campaigns emerge from the alliance formation process of hundreds of civil society organizations. This process can then be disrupted with an increase in repression against the mobilizing groups, if they include systematic and frequent killings, for example. In the case of Chile, civil society organizations first built coalitions with the Catholic Church as the protector institution, from where they were able to expand as repression was maintained at manageable levels. This means that the mass movement grew out of a place in society that was slightly more open, that the regime could not or would not repress more brutally. Instead, given their finding that nonviolent campaigns emerge in “flatter terrain, and older, more durable authoritarian regimes” compared to armed insurgencies, Chenoweth and Lewis (2014) conclude that civil resistance campaigns seem to be “emerging where resistance is supposedly ‘difficult’” and armed insurgencies where it is “easy” (421-422). Presumably their model suggests that the environment where nonviolent campaigns emerge is easy because flatter terrain makes it easier for security forces to repress, and because more durable regimes suggest that they are stronger governments.

This chapter's theory and empirical results suggest otherwise: mass movements occur in flatter terrain because they are common in urban areas and unlikely to emerge in remote areas of the country. The fact that the armed forces could theoretically use force more easily in flatter surfaces than in rugged terrain does not mean that they can: as explained above, systematically using lethal force against unarmed civilians is costly domestically and internationally, especially when regimes have linkages to the United States, Western Europe, and international human

rights organizations. The targets of extremely high repression by the Pinochet regime went underground and the same regime used different levels of force against protesters. In fact, mass public actions by the opposition did not occur until the state response was manageable.

Therefore, while mass civil resistance campaigns can manage moderate levels of repression, this dissertation shows that large-scale protests will end or that the movement will go underground if systematic and lethal violence is used. This chapter is more consistent with work by (Levitsky and Way 2010) on competitive authoritarian regimes, which argues that authoritarian regimes that start to tolerate public dissent may be more likely to experience an uprising, as “new freedoms allow people to participate who otherwise would be too afraid.” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 308) Similarly, (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Meernik et al. 2012, 237) find that a certain level of “openness” is necessary for human rights organizations to operate locally, and for naming and shaming campaigns to be successful.

Another finding from the civil resistance literature is that the effect of international intervention on mass movements is indeterminate, though there is very little academic research on the subject (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011).<sup>22</sup> The dissertation finds support for the idea that political and economic pressure from the United States, as well as naming and shaming from the OAS and the UN, in general make repression—especially the gravest forms, such as forced disappearances and systematic torture of prisoners—more costly for the regime. Given the varied effects that repression has on mobilization, as this dissertation has shown, how international actors affect mobilization by influencing state violence is difficult to assess in general terms.

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<sup>22</sup> There is more policy research on this question, such by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict and the U.S. Institute of Peace (especially by Maria Stephan). Scholars such as Matthew Cebul, Jaime Jackson, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan are currently working on this question to fill the gap.

There are four caveats to my observation that international pressure makes repression more costly and that it will thus lead to a reduction in state crackdowns. Repression may increase in specific instances, such as when international actors like the Red Cross visit detention facilities. In order to avoid the international community from learning about the conditions of the prisoners, the armed forces may transfer prisoners to other facilities, and threaten prisoners and their families with retaliation if they provide their testimony to human rights organizations (Confidential Report, Vicariate of Solidarity, November 1976). Second, the international community usually focuses on the most violent forms of repression, which may lead to a reduction in those but an increase in other forms that are also damaging to mass mobilization. At the same time, some international actors such as the United States at times send mixed signals. The U.S., for example, supported the anti-Marxist campaign that Pinochet was waging in Chile, especially in the context of the Cold War, but also started pressuring the military junta for its “excesses” and gross human rights abuses. At other times the United States, or other countries in Western Europe, may support a regime for economic or other reasons in spite of its human rights violations. Meanwhile international human rights organizations expose violations and demand better behavior.

Third, at least in the case of Chile international pressure worked to make repression more costly for the Pinochet regime because of local human rights organizations like the Vicariate of Solidarity, FASIC, and the Chilean Human Rights Commission. These reputable organizations did the essential work of recording human rights abuses within the country in great detail, and of connecting international actors to key players within the country to learn more about the situation. Research on human rights organizations in other settings has also found that the linkage between local organizations and international actors is essential for impact (Bob 2005,

2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen et al. 1999). Fourth, as explained above, it is clear that the United States and Western institutions such as the OAS and UN had leverage with the Pinochet regime (Levitsky and Way 2010). Without leverage it is difficult to see how naming and shaming, and political and economic pressure, would have an effect on the regime's behavior.

An important finding in the civil resistance literature, and from the resource mobilization model in particular, is “that prior demonstrations and riots—which are generally not maximalist in nature—are useful indicators in predicting onsets of nonviolent uprisings in subsequent years.” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 22) This chapter's theoretical framework is not only consistent with this finding, but can also provide an explanation for this empirical connection, as well as the conditions under which we will observe these reformist and smaller attempts to mobilize becoming larger and more challenging to the state.

From (Sutton et al., 2014) we know that “a pre-existing campaign infrastructure increases the likelihood of increased domestic mobilization ... after violent repression...” (Sutton et al. 2014, 559) The idea is that what they call “spontaneous protests” can be overcome by government propaganda and have difficulties adapting to repression. In contrast, this chapter puts forth the view that protests against repressive authoritarian regimes are very unlikely to be “spontaneous” in the sense that they completely lack “a campaign infrastructure.” Tracing all the public actions that took place against the Pinochet regime from the Vicariate of Solidarity secret reports, it becomes clear that even the smallest protests—of 20 or so women protesting in front of *La Moneda* presidential palace asking about the whereabouts of their loved ones—had an infrastructure behind them. The difference between the protests that became larger and more consistent, which were able to dilute repression, were those that emerged from the alliances of

many civil society organizations that were not so threatening to the regime. Protests by more threatening actors would have likely resulted in greater repression, which would make subsequent protests less likely.

Finally, studies on economic crises and mass mobilization have generally shown a positive relationship between the two (Grasso and Giugni 2016; Walton and Ragin 1990). There are some conditions under which economic crises will be unlikely to yield mass protests, however. This chapter argues that systematic lethal force against participants of a mass movement will not allow for large-scale public actions even with the aggravating circumstance of a failing economy. In Chile mass protests did not start until 1983, well after a major economic crisis hit in 1982 that started in 1980 (*Crisis Económica 1982*, Memoria Chilena). In addition, I specify two ways in which the economic crisis in Chile made mass protests more likely. The first is the fact that hundreds of civil society organizations emerged for subsistence purposes—they mitigated unemployment, hunger, lack of health care, as well as offered basic necessities when the state and the economy were failing many Chileans. These neighborhood associations, largely funded by the Catholic Church and the international community, kept the population connected and served as a mobilizing locus once repression decreased toward those operating them. The mobilizing potential thus vastly increased as a consequence of the economic crisis in a way that could avoid the worst of the repression from the state. Second, as mentioned earlier, economic crises may make the information that states can extract from protests less clear. Authoritarian governments may allow protests on economic matters, for example, hoping to diffuse popular anger for a lack of civil and political liberties, to show its domestic and international audience that the government allows public dissent, or to gain information about the performance of local officials (Weiss 2014). However, these protests may either transform themselves to demand

regime change once enough alliances have formed and participants have less fear of repression, or they may have been operating from the beginning under the assumption that they will challenge the state in more maximalist ways as soon as they are able to do so.

## **CONCLUSION**

By examining the universe of opposition organizations, and the precursors to direct regime opposition, as well as the pattern of repression that is directed toward each, we are more likely to observe where mass mobilization emerges and consolidates. The level of repression that the state may perpetrate is not constant across time or targets; therefore, whether there can be or not mass mobilization also varies significantly. It is not “one” opposition movement or “one” campaign that leads hundreds of thousands or millions of people to the streets. Mass protests are a result of various segments of the population, through their work (NGOs, labor unions, students, professional associations), in their neighborhoods (shantytown associations), and via their activism (relatives of the victims), coming together by building alliances. Alliances are forged when violent repression is manageable, and they are dissolved when the consequences of maintaining them are systematic executions, torture, or disappearances. As Chenoweth and Ulfelder point out in their recent publication on the onset of nonviolent movements, “[c]onventional approaches regarding popular grievances, political opportunities, and resource mobilization tell us something about where nonviolent uprisings have emerged, but not as much as one might expect. . . . Their modest performance may be partly a function of the limitations of available data, but we believe it is partly a function of the limits of the theories themselves as well.” (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2017, 318)

This chapter seeks to innovate empirically and theoretically to try to answer this question. I contend that we have been formulating questions regarding repression too broadly. State repression has a multiplicity of effects, which demands fine-grained measurement in order to disentangle some of these questions. Theoretically, this chapter puts forth the idea that alliance formation is crucial to understand the emergence and consolidation of mass protest movements.

An alliance between two opposition groups is likely to form when they provide each other with numbers—people to protest, strike, petition, etc.—and when they are perceived to help reduce state repression or at least maintain it at the same level. Had repression remained lethal and indiscriminate in Chile after 1977, or had it continued to systematically subject large swaths of the population to torture, executions and disappearances, we would be far less likely to observe the building of alliances between hundreds of civil society organizations. Without these coalitions, efforts to counter or overthrow the regime would have remained localized, atomized and even underground, without the possibility of large-scale public challenges. These two conditions for alliance formation are based on the logic of how mass civil resistance campaigns succeed against repressive regimes: the priorities are recruiting as many participants as possible and reducing or maintaining repression to manageable levels.

Unmanageable levels of violent repression—such as frequent executions, torture, and disappearances—makes alliances extremely difficult, unless they are to protector institutions, such as was the Catholic Church and to a lesser extent human rights NGOs. I find that mass participation is not primarily about persuading others that the costs of protesting are worth it—there is a threshold over which people largely demobilize, organize locally, and go underground. To gain followers far beyond first movers who are willing to demonstrate publicly, there has to be some measure of restraint from the part of the government. This idea leads to the inference

that mass protest movements in fact occur in places with relatively favorable conditions, most likely following extremely unfavorable conditions. This is contrary to the conclusion that Chenoweth and Lewis reach after comparing the models that predict civil wars in and those that predict nonviolent uprisings: “The only significant correlates of nonviolent campaigns are flatter terrain and older, more durable authoritarian regimes. ... The substantive findings are counter-intuitive and paradoxical: violent campaigns seem to emerge where resistance is ‘easy’, whereas nonviolent resistance is emerging where resistance is supposedly ‘difficult.’” (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013, 421-422)

The question then becomes what restrains regimes from using frequent lethal force against the opposition. The particularities of the case of Chile become important in this regard. First, Chile had a long and proud history of democracy, which included military servicemen and women who were for the most part subservient to the civilian elected leadership. The democratic tradition, as well as the high level of citizen participation associated with leftist parties and Allende’s Popular Unity government in the 1970s, can also account for the culture of organizing. Second, the economic, political, and social links between Chile, the United States and Western institutions, gave the latter leverage to pressure the Pinochet regime to improve their human rights record (Levitsky and Way 2010). Third, the important role of the Catholic Church in Chile, which was willing to serve as a protector against human rights abuses and even as an advocate for democracy, is undeniable. Mass mobilization would likely emerge and consolidate differently—if at all—in a totalitarian state spanning generations, without a history of democracy and a strong civil society, without links to Western institutions, and no institution able to protect victims of the state. But even in those localities, it would be extremely unlikely to observe mass

mobilization at a time when the state was systematically killing, torturing or disappearing the opposition.

This chapter implies that, had violent repression continued with the pattern from 1973 to 1977, we would have not observed mass mobilization, underground activities would have probably continued, and importantly, the proponents of armed action to overthrow the regime would have gained traction. The reason is that by early 1983, ten years into the dictatorship, people were losing hope for a peaceful exit and return to democracy. The Patriotic Front Manuel Rodríguez, which was 1,000-strong at the time, was entering Chile after getting training in Cuba with the hopes of fighting the Chilean Armed Forces. The armed group was largely sidelined by the mass national protests that followed shortly thereafter thanks in large part to a reduction in state violence against most opposition groups and the forging of alliances. The United States government understood the fact that the armed option would become more prominent if Pinochet did not improve its human rights record and agree to negotiations with the opposition, evidenced by a declassified “Special National Intelligence Estimate” by the CIA from October 4, 1983. In this report the CIA outlines the downsides of the Armed Forces continuing to repress protests, and of allowing the MIR’s and FPMR’s “ploy” to use violence in order to get the military junta to respond with more repression, thereby strengthening the radical left. The United States without a doubt laid out the possible scenarios to its connections within the Pinochet regime, and relied heavily on the fact that Generals in the Chilean Armed Forces were increasingly dissatisfied with how Pinochet was conducting himself.

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### **Appendix A: Emails sent to professors to define must-do cases:**

En mi trabajo *considero grupos disidentes* a los siguientes tipos de asociaciones: partidos políticos, sindicatos, instituciones religiosas/ecuménicas, ONGs de derechos humanos, asociaciones de estudiantes, asociaciones de profesionales, grupos poblacionales, juntas de vecinos, agrupaciones de víctimas, agrupaciones de mujeres (feministas, por ejemplo), grupos de arte y resistencia cultural, y grupos armados/terroristas.

Clarificación: No hay necesidad de que usted escoja grupos de todos estos tipos – es sólo para clarificar lo que estoy abarcando con esta definición.

Quisiera una *lista de grupos disidentes que usted considere importante de acuerdo a los siguientes criterios*:

#### ***Los criterios más importantes***

- Los grupos que fueron más reprimidos por el gobierno y los menos reprimidos por el gobierno.
- Los grupos más “astutos” en cómo manejaron o evadieron la represión, así como también los menos “astutos” en esta misma área.
- Los grupos que tuvieron más impacto en la resistencia contra la dictadura y en el trabajo que se hizo para que regresara la democracia.

#### ***Criterios un poco menos importantes***

- Los grupo más grandes (los más exitosos en términos del número de participantes o personas involucradas en la organización), así como también los más chicos que no pudieron crecer.
- Los más exitosos en términos de cohesión interna: sin facciones (o con pocas facciones), sin muchas riñas internas, etc. Así como también los más fragmentados, con más riñas.
- Los grupos con un nivel alto de formalización de la organización, así como también los menos y más informales.

### **Appendix B: Representative List of Opposition Groups to be Fully Coded**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Post-coup?</b>	<b>Type</b>
Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)	0	political party
Partido Humanista (PH)	1	political party
MAPU-OC (MOC)	0	political party
Partido Radical Socialista Democrático (PRSD)/ Partido Radical-Luengo	1	political party
Partido Comunista (PC)	0	political party
Partido Socialista (PS)	0	political party

Partido Socialista-Almeydista/ PS-Almeyda	1	political party
Partido Socialista-Movimiento Recuperacionista	1	political party
Union Popular/ Unidad Popular (UP)	0	political party
Partido Democrata Cristiano/ Democracia Cristiana (DC/ PDC)	0	political party
Movimiento Democratico Popular (MDP)	1	political party
Grupo por la Convergencia Socialista	1	political party
Grupo de los 8 (aunque eran 9)	1	political party
Union Socialista Popular (USOPO)	0	political party
Partido Comunista Revolucionario (PCR)	0	political party
Union Comunista Revolucionaria	0	political party
Partido de Izquierda Radical/ Movimiento Radical de Izquierda Independiente	0	political party
Accion Popular Independiente (API)	0	political party
Partido Social Demócrata	0	political party
Partido Liberal	0	political party
Intransigencia Democratica	1	political party
Partido Democratico Nacional (PADENA)	0	political party
Partido Republicano	1	political party
Grupo de los 13 o ANDE	1	political party
Grupo de los Siete	1	labor union
Cordon Industrial Estacion Central	0	labor union
Federacion Nacional Textil	0	labor union
Federacion Industrial Ferroviaria de Chile	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de OO. de la Construccion de la Provincia de Santiago	0	labor union
Federacion Personal Conservacion y Revision	0	labor union
Sindicato Estrella de Chile de Talagante	0	labor union
Agrupacion Trabajadores Inds. Zaror	0	labor union
Agrupacion Trabajadores Inds. Besser	0	labor union
Sindicato Nacional de Talleres Metalurgicos	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Sigdo Koopers	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Julio Serra B.	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Jacobo Duchler	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Confecines Luvy	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial de Fabrica de Camisas Gual y Cia.	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Lanificio Panamericana S.A. (textil)	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Farnesa	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Socometal	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Selleros	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional EE.PP. Metalurgica Cerrillos	0	labor union
Sindicato profesional Obreros Gasfiter, Calefaccionistas y Obras Sanitarias	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Prov. De EE. De Casa Particulares	0	labor union
Asociacion Nacional de Empleados de Impuestos Internos ANEII	0	labor union

Asociacion Nacional de Empleados de Tesoreria	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial CTI FENSA MADEMSA	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Termokohn	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional Mixto F.A.B. (plastico)	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Femosa	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de Trabajadores de la Asociacion Chilena de Seguridad	0	labor union
Asociacion de Obreros de Obras Sanitarias "ANODOS"	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Vidrios Planos Cerrillos	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial Opici de Deo	0	labor union
Sindicato Imagro	0	labor union
Sindicato Unico Maestranza Maipu	0	labor union
Sindicato Ind. Talleres Metalurgicos Tamet	0	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de la Compania Tecno Industrial CTI	0	labor union
Sindicato de Actores de Radio y Television (SIDARTE)	0	labor union
Sindicato Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones HABITAT	1	labor union
Sindicato Interempresa de Trabajadores de Locomocion Linea Recoleta-Lira	NA	labor union
Sindicato Interempresa de Trabajadores del Programa de absorcion de la cesantia PIMO	1	labor union
Comision Nacional Campesina	1	labor union
Asociacion de Funcionarios del Hospital Clinico Jose Joaquin Aguirre	1	labor union
Consejo de Trabajadores de la Vicaria	1	labor union
Sindicato Dos en Uno	1	labor union
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Computacion	1	labor union
Sindicato de la Industrial Textil Yarur	0	labor union
Confederacion de Trabajadores del Sector Privado	0	labor union
Sindicato de la Industria Textil Lanificio Panamericano	0	labor union
Comite de Cesantes de Panal	1	labor union
Confederacion Gastronomic, Hoteleros, de la Alimentacion y Actividades Similares	1	labor union
Sindicato Profesional de Empleados de la Papelera	0	labor union
Sindicato Industrial de la Papelera	0	labor union
Comite Permanente del Episcopado	0	faith-based
Vicaria de la Solidaridad	1	faith-based
Comite Pro Paz/ El Comite de Cooperacion para la Paz en Chile (COPACHI)	1	faith-based
Comite 2	1	faith-based
Fundacion de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas (FASIC)	1	faith-based
EPES (Educacion Popular en Salud)	1	faith-based
Fundacion Cardijn	0	faith-based
Sagrados Corazones	0	faith-based
Vicaria Pastoral de Obrera	1	faith-based
Movimiento Familiar Cristiano	1	faith-based
Comite de Ayuda Fraternal de la Poblacion San Luis	1	faith-based

Comunidad Cristiana de Villa Francia	1	faith-based
Comunidades Cristianas de Base de la Parroquia El Senior de Renca	0	faith-based
Instituto de Difusion Social (INDISO)	0	faith-based
Oficina Nacional de Catequesis (ONAC)	0	faith-based
Accion Catolica Especializada	0	faith-based
Coordinadora de Comunidades Cristianas de Sectores Populares	1	faith-based
Servicio Evangelico para el Desarrollo (SEPADE)	1	faith-based
Comunidad Cristiana de La Victoria	1	faith-based
Parroquia Nuestra Seniora de La Victoria	0	faith-based
Comunidades Cristianas de Estudiantes Fiscales (COCEF)	1	faith-based
Ayuda Cristiana Evangelica (ACE)	0	faith-based
Decanato Santa Rosa	0	faith-based
Comite de Defensa de Derechos Humanos y Sindicales (CODEHS)	0	human rights NGO
Coordinadora de Organizaciones por los Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Comision Chilena de Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Comite de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo (CODEPU)	1	human rights NGO
Comision de Ayuda a los Refugiados (COMAR)	1	human rights NGO
Programa de Apoyo Laboral (PRAL)	1	human rights NGO
PIDEE (Proteccion a la Infancia Daniada por los Estados de Emergencia)	1	human rights NGO
Servicio de Paz y Justicia/ Servicio Paz y Justicia (SERPAJ)	1	human rights NGO
Centro de Asesoría y Promoción Electoral del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Coordinadora Nacional de Entidades Humanitarias	1	human rights NGO
Coordinacion de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales	0	human rights NGO
Fundacion INVICA (institucion de apoyo a los organismos sociales)	0	human rights NGO
Familiares de Jose Manuel Parada, Santiago Nattino y Manuel Guerrero (red)	1	human rights NGO
Comite de derechos humanos "Pacem in Terris"	1	human rights NGO
Comite de Activacion por la Vigencia de los Derechos Humanos	1	human rights NGO
Amnistia Chile	0	human rights NGO
Comite de Defensa de Derechos Humanos y Sindicales (CODES)	0	human rights NGO
Instituto Latinoamericano de Sicologia/Salud Mental y Derechos Humanos (ILAS)	1	professionals
Colegio de Psicologos	0	professionals
Comite Imprenta Central	0	professionals
Comite Litografia Americana	0	professionals
Colegio Nacional de Periodistas	0	professionals
Cruzada CIVITAS	1	professionals
Escuela Nueva Comunicacion	1	professionals
Instituto Latinoamericano de Salud Mental	1	professionals
Cetro de Investigacion y Asesoría Sindical (CIASI)	1	professionals
Colegio de Arquitectos	0	professionals
CENPROS	1	professionals

Comite Intergubernamental de Migraciones	0	professionals
Asociacion de Academicos de la Universidad Catolica	0	professionals
Asociacion Nacional de Prensa	0	professionals
Asociacion de Academicos de la Universidad de Santiago	1	professionals
Colegio de Dentistas	0	professionals
Coordinadora de Colegios Profesionales por el fin al Exilio	1	professionals
Asociacion Chilena de Agencias de Publicidad	0	professionals
Comision de Abogados por la Democracia	1	professionals
Circulos Profesionales de la Academia de Humanismo Cristiano	1	professionals
Union de Jovenes Democraticos	1	students
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (FECh)	0	students
Estudiantes del Pedagogico	0	students
Estudiantes de la Universidad Tecnologica de Chile (INACAP)	0	students
Grupo de ayunantes Humanistas Cristianos estudiantes	1	students
Centro de Estudiantes de Economia de la Universidad de Chile	0	students
Centro de Alumnas Liceo Santiago de Niniás	0	students
Coordinadora Estudiantil de Actividades Solidarias	1	students
Servicios Culturales Universitarios	1	students
Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios (FESES)	0	students
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Santiago (FEUSACH)	1	students
Centro de Alumno de Leyes de la Universidad de Chile	0	students
Accion Democratica Estudiantil	1	students
Comite Democratico de Ingenieria en Computacion (USACH)	1	students
Alumnos Democraticos de la UC	1	students
Comite de Sancionados USACH	1	students
Centro de Alumnos de Geografia de la UC	0	students
Centro de Alumnos de Teatro UC	0	students
Centro de Alumnos de Historia UC	0	students
Agrupacion de Alumnos Sancionados de las Universidades de Chile y Tecnica del Estado	1	students
Coordinacion de organizaciones de mujeres MEMCH-83	1	women's rights
Cooperativa por Soledad Larrain, Aida Moreno, Eliana Largo y Coty Silva	1	women's rights
Movimiento de Mujeres Pobladoras MOMUPO	1	women's rights
Comite de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de la Mujer	1	women's rights
Mujeres de Chile	1	women's rights
Federacion de Estudiantes Secundarios	1	women's rights
RIDEM	1	women's rights
Arpilleristas Zona Oriente	1	women's rights
Talleres Solidarios de la Parroquia Nuestra Senora Reina de los Apostoles	1	women's rights
Departamento Femenino de la Coordinadora Nacional Sindical	1	women's rights
Agrupacion de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos (AFDD)	1	victims' groups
Familiares de las personas procesadas miembros de la Fuerza Aerea en el	1	victims' groups

"proceso FACH"		
Agrupaciones de Familiares de Ejecutados Politicos (AFEP)	1	victims' groups
Agrupaciones de Familiares de Relegados y Ex- Relegados (AFAREL)	1	victims' groups
Coordinadora de Agrupaciones de Familiares de Victimas de la Represion (umbrella)	1	victims' groups
Red informal Orellana	1	victims' groups
Movimiento contra la tortura Sebastian Acevedo/ Movimiento Sebastian Acevedo	1	victims' groups
Campania por la Vida	1	victims' groups
Comite Pro Retorno de Exiliados (CPRE)	1	victims' groups
Agrupacion de Padres de Universitariios Detenidos	1	victims' groups
Familiares de muertos en presuntos enfrentamientos en 1981	1	victims' groups
Comite de Familiares de Exiliados	1	victims' groups
Las Brigadas del Pueblo (BP)	1	armed
Frente Patriotico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR)	1	armed
Convergencia 19 de abril (ex Militantes Rojos)	1	armed
Comando Lumi Videla	1	armed
Comando Ambrosio Badilla	1	armed
Comando Juan Antono Trujillo	1	armed
Milicias de la Resistencia Popular	1	armed
Mando Nacional de las Milicias de la Resistencia Popular	1	armed
Comando Miliciano Martires de Lonquen	1	armed
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores La Victoria	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores El Teniente Merino	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/ Pobladores/ La Legua	0	neighborhood
Fundacion para la Accion Vecinal y Comunitaria (AVEC)	1	neighborhood
Movimiento Poblacional Dignidad/ Dignidad	1	neighborhood
Coordinadora de Organizaciones Sociales Populares	1	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Renca	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion San Ramon	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Estacion Central	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion La Pitana	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Melipilla	0	neighborhood
Junta de Vecinos/Poblacion Cerro Navia	0	neighborhood
Comedor San Daniel	1	neighborhood
Comedor Infantil Poblacion Monte II	1	neighborhood
Centro El Cortijo	1	neighborhood
Comedor Infantil Poblacion Monte II	1	neighborhood
Comedor Los Cruceros	1	neighborhood
Comedores Barrancas Norte	1	neighborhood
Comedor San Pablo	1	neighborhood
Taller "El Esfuerzo"	1	neighborhood

Talleres de Mujeres Pobladoras	1	neighborhood
Programa Metodista de Salud Integral (PROMESI)	1	neighborhood
Comite de Derechos Humanos de la Villa Mexico	1	neighborhood
Ollas Comunes de San Bernardo	1	neighborhood
Olla comun de La Victoria	1	neighborhood
Sociedad de Talleres Artesanales de Conchali	1	neighborhood
Unidad vecinal N 14 de la poblacion "Dos de Marzo" de San Miguel	1	neighborhood
Centro de Educacion y Tecnologia (CET)	1	neighborhood
Huertos Familiares de la Poblacion Huamachuco 2	1	neighborhood
Comite de los Sin Casa de Santa Adriana	1	neighborhood
Organismos Juveniles de las Unidades Vecinales de La Legua	1	neighborhood
Comunidad Juvenil de la Parroquia San Pedro y San Pablo	0	neighborhood
El Colectivo Muralista La Garrapata	1	art/ cultural
Las Brigadas Ramona Parra (BRP)	0	art/ cultural
Servicios Culturales "Puelche"	1	art/ cultural
Casa Folclorica "Donia Javiera Carrera"	1	art/ cultural
Centro Cultural Catolico de Renca	0	art/ cultural
Compania de Teatro Ictus	0	art/ cultural
Centro "El Canelo de Nos" (educacion, region metro)	1	art/ cultural
Taller Sur	0	art/ cultural
Grupo Zapallo	1	art/ cultural
Corporacion Nacional Pro-Defensa de la Paz	1	art/ cultural
Casa de la Cultura Andre Jarlan	1	art/ cultural
Comite Neruda 80 anios	1	art/ cultural
Academia Chilena de la Lengua	0	art/ cultural
Teatro Urbano Contemporaneo (TEUMO)	1	art/ cultural
Grupo de Teatro La Feria	1	art/ cultural
Grupo Illapu	0	art/ cultural
Grupo de Teatro Aleph	0	art/ cultural
Proyecto de Desarrollo para un Censo Nacional (PRODEN)	1	informal/ protest
Alianza Democratica	1	informal/ protest
Liga Comunista	0	informal/ protest
Movimiento Libertad	1	informal/ protest
Acuerdo Nacional por el NO (ACUSO)	1	informal/ protest
Asociacion de Jubilados Dependientes de la Caja Bancaria de pensiones	0	informal/ protest
Programa Regional del Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe de la OIT (PREALC)	1	informal/ protest
Movimiento Solidaridad Familiar	1	informal/ protest
Frente Contra las Unidades de Fomento	1	informal/ protest
Mesa de Concertacion Social del CNT	1	informal/ protest
Comite Pro Libertad de Expresion	1	informal/ protest
Comite Juvenil Pro Retorno de Exiliados	1	informal/ protest

## Appendix C: Codebook

### Opposition Groups in the Metropolitan Region of Chile Dataset (OGMC), 1973-1989

#### Codebook

Version 2, April 2018

Group-year data

Principal Investigator: Consuelo Amat, Yale University ([\(Cavallo, 1991\)](#))

Variable Name	Variable Description				
orgid	Unique group identifier				
group	Name of opposition group				
year	Calendar year				
s_month	Month when opposition group started				
s_year	Year when opposition group started				
e_month	Month when opposition group ended				
e_year	Year when opposition group ended				
postcoup	Indicator for whether the group started before or after the September 11, 1973 coup, which marked the beginning of the dictatorship. 1=group started after the September 11, 1973 coup and before the October 5, 1988 national plebiscite that ended Pinochet's rule. If group was formed after the Oct 5, 1988 plebiscite, exclude from dataset; 0=group started before September 11, 1973				
institutiontype	Denotes the type of group in the social and political landscape. These types reveal the institutional support and networks that the group potentially enjoys, as well as the organizing tradition from where they emerge. 1=banned political party; 2=union; 3=religious or faith-based group; 4=human rights NGO; 5=professional association; 6=students group; 7=women's rights/LGBTQ group; 8=victims' group; 9=armed group; 10=territorially based organization (such as a neighborhood association or soup kitchen in a shantytown); 11=art/cultural resistance group; and 12=informal/protest command group.				
geog_type10_type3	Denotes the region where the territorial organization was based when it started. Only relevant for territorial organizations and religious organizations: type=10, type=3 <table border="1" data-bbox="678 1816 1230 1879"> <thead> <tr> <th>Coding</th> <th>Region</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>Santiago: North</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Coding	Region	1	Santiago: North
Coding	Region				
1	Santiago: North				

		2	Santiago: East																																														
		3	Santiago: West																																														
		4	Santiago: South																																														
		5	Santiago: Center																																														
		6	Chacabuco																																														
		7	Cordillera																																														
		8	Maipo																																														
		9	Melipilla																																														
		10	Talagante																																														
		11	Coordinating organizations/ present in more than one area. <sup>23</sup>																																														
industry_type2	<p>Indicates the type of industry to which the labor union belongs (institutiontype=2).</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Industry</th> <th>Code</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>Primary</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Agriculture, cattle, hunting, and silviculture</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fishing</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mining</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>Secondary (Industrial)</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Non-metal manufacturing</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Metal manufacturing</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Electricity, gas and water</td> <td>6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Construction</td> <td>7</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>Tertiary (Services)</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Wholesale trade</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Hotels and restaurants</td> <td>9</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Transportation, storage, and communications</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Financial intermediaries</td> <td>11</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Real estate and rentals</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Public administration and defense</td> <td>13</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Education</td> <td>14</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Social services and health care</td> <td>15</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Condo and building administration</td> <td>16</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Other services</td> <td>17</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>Other</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Coalition of multi-industry labor unions</td> <td>18</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Industry	Code	<i>Primary</i>		Agriculture, cattle, hunting, and silviculture	1	Fishing	2	Mining	3	<i>Secondary (Industrial)</i>		Non-metal manufacturing	4	Metal manufacturing	5	Electricity, gas and water	6	Construction	7	<i>Tertiary (Services)</i>		Wholesale trade	8	Hotels and restaurants	9	Transportation, storage, and communications	10	Financial intermediaries	11	Real estate and rentals	12	Public administration and defense	13	Education	14	Social services and health care	15	Condo and building administration	16	Other services	17	<i>Other</i>		Coalition of multi-industry labor unions	18
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ideology_cat	1=ultra leftist; 2=leftist; 6=center; 3=Catholic; 4=ecumenical; 5=other																																																
ideology_description	Describe the ideology of the group by summarizing the “set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the																																																

<sup>23</sup> For religious groups if they did not come from a particular *población* and were operating in Santiago or as part of the Arzobispado, I coded them as 11 as well.

	objectives pursued on behalf of that group, and a program of action” <sup>24</sup>
prim_obj	Categorizes the group’s stated primary objective. 1=subsistence (basic services for the poor, such as the soup kitchens); 2=protection for those being persecuted (hiding or helping people seek exile, for example); 3=victim or relative of victim assistance (legal, financial, psychological or health-related help); 4=government reform in the social realm (education, women’s and LGBTQ rights, etc.); 5=government reform in the economic realm (labor, market, taxes, etc.); 6=documenting and denouncing human rights abuses; 7=regime change and elections, 8=regime change and establish new order
op_capacity1	Measures the operational capacity/command and control of the group to accomplish its primary objective. 1=low operational capacity (it is common that their planned actions fail or are not realized given poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons); 2=medium operational capacity (sometimes their planned actions fail or are not realized due to poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons); 3=high operational capacity (their planned actions almost never fail/ are almost always successfully executed)
sec_obj	Categorizes the group’s stated secondary objective. 1=subsistence (basic services for the poor, such as the soup kitchens); 2=protection for those being persecuted (hiding or helping people seek exile, for example); 3=victim or relative of victim assistance (legal, financial, psychological or health-related help); 4=government reform in the social realm (education, women’s and LGBTQ rights, etc.); 5=government reform in the economic realm (labor, market, taxes, etc.); 6=documenting and denouncing human rights abuses; 7=regime change and elections; 8=regime change and establish new order
op_capacity2	Measures the operational capacity/command and control of the group to accomplish its secondary objective. 1=low operational capacity (it is common that their planned actions fail or are not realized given poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons); 2=medium operational capacity (sometimes their planned actions fail or are not realized due to poor coordination, logistical planning, lack of resources, among other operational reasons); 3=high operational capacity (their planned actions almost never

<sup>24</sup> Ideology defined as “ideas and normative commitments that motivate and coordinate, as the bearers of identities, strategies, and institutions, as normative constraints on group strategies.” Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, and Elisabeth Jean Wood (2014) “Ideology in civil war: Instrumental adoption and beyond” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 213-226.

	fail/ are almost always successfully executed)
obj_description	Description of the group's primary and secondary objectives
1stmovers	Indicates the segment of the society from where the majority of the first movers come from: 1=peasants ( <i>campesinos</i> )/ rural areas; 2=military; 3=intelligentsia/ intellectuals; 4=religious elite; 5=poor/ informal economy; 6=workers; 7=other
1stmovers_description	Background of the founding members of the group.
lead	Indicates the segment of the society from where the majority of the leaders come from: 1=peasants ( <i>campesinos</i> )/ rural areas; 2=military; 3=intelligentsia/ intellectuals; 4=religious elite; 5=poor/ informal economy; 6=workers; 7=other
lead_description	Background of the leadership of the group.
santiago	Whether or not group has a presence beyond the city of Santiago. 1=presence beyond Santiago; 0=presence only in Santiago
region	Number of states ( <i>regiones</i> ) where the group has a presence.
region_description	Describe where the group has a presence by giving name of town, city, region, etc.
precursor	Indicates whether or not there was an antecedent organization from where the current one emerged. 1=group emerged from a past institution; 0=otherwise
precursor_description	Name of precursor organization
merged	Indicates if the group merged with another one and therefore ceased to exist as such. If the group merged with another organization during the dictatorship (from September 11, 1973 to October 5, 1988), the dataset treats it as if the group ended and therefore does not continue coding it for the remaining years. 1=group merged with another one; 0=otherwise
merged_description	Name(s) of organization(s) with which group merged.
takeover	Indicates whether or not the group takes over another organization. In this case the group doing the taking over does not cease to exist. The organization that is acquired ceases to exist for the purposes of this dataset for the remaining years. 1=group takes over another organization; 0=otherwise
takeover_description	Name(s) or organization(s) that group added.
parish_foundingsite	Indicates whether or not the head priest at the main local parish, where the group was founded, is known to support the Pinochet dictatorship. 1=head priest at the main local parish/church at founding site supports the Pinochet dictatorship; 0=otherwise
allies	Name of the allies with which the group actively works. "Actively working" with the group means that they organized more than one event together and/or cooperated in more than one protest, and/or coordinated their actions more than once, such as to make public statements together. If there is evidence that they worked only once together, it does not constitute an alliance.

	<p>An alliance is a formal or informal relationship between two organizations in order to cooperate to achieve their primary or secondary objectives (as coded in the variables prim_obj and sec_obj), where there is mutual benefit and some cost (social, political or economic) associated with violating the agreement.</p> <p>This type of collaboration is evaluated yearly. If an alliance exists between two organizations on a particular year, but there is no evidence that it continues the following year, the alliance is coded for that first year but not for the subsequent one. For example, if there was collaboration between X and Q in more than one occasion in 1975 and there is no evidence that the collaboration continues into 1976 or later, the alliance is still coded for 1975 and 1976, but not for 1977 forward.</p>
type_allies	<p>1=has at least one political party as an ally; 2=has at least one labor union as an ally; 3=has at least one religious or faith-based organization as an ally; 4=has at least one human rights NGO as an ally; 5=has at least one professional association as an ally; 6=has at least one student association as an ally; 7=has at least one women's/LGBTQ rights organization as an ally; 8=has at least one victims' group as an ally; 9=has at least one territorial group as an ally; 10=has at least one armed group as an ally; 11=has at least one art/cultural resistance organization as an ally; 12=has at least one protest command group as an ally</p> <p>**If the group has several types of allies, write down the numbers separated by commas (for example: write down "1,5, 12" if the group has at least one political party, one professional association, and one protest command group as allies)</p>
clandestine	<p>Indicates the level of secrecy with which the group operates. 1=group is completely public, 2=some of the group's activities are public and others are clandestine, 3=group operates completely underground</p>
violence	<p>1=There was at least one instance of use of violence by the group; 0=otherwise</p> <p>Note: The use of violence could have been for self-defense, throwing rocks at police counts as violence, and setting off bombs to kill people as well. Setting off bombs to cut electricity does not count. If this instance of violence is isolated and it was only an individual, or a very small group, that perpetrated the act of violence in contradiction to the organization's norms, it does not count as violence=1.</p>
training	<p>Indicates if the organization provides educational programs or training to its members in order to do the work of the group. The</p>

	<p>variable also measures the level of preparation that is provided through these programs.</p> <p>1=there are no trainings or educational programs for the group's members; 2=there is some training or educational opportunities but they are not systematized or obligatory; 3=there is a compulsory and systematic training/ educational program for members.</p>
train_description	Description of training and educational programs that the organization makes available for members: what type of trainings or educational programs? What is the frequency with which these trainings/programs take place? Who participates (only leaders, members with less rank)?
structure	<p>Indicates the group's organizational structure.</p> <p>1=hierarchical and connected; 2=decentralized and connected; 3=mixed and connected (some parts are hierarchical and others are decentralized, but they are all connected); 4=hierarchical and not connected/ compartmentalized (clandestine cell structure); 5=decentralized and not connected/compartmentalized (clandestine networks); 6=mixed and not connected (some parts of the organization are hierarchical and others are decentralized, but they are all compartmentalized)</p>
resources	<p>Proxy for the amount of monetary resources that the group has at its disposal.</p> <p>1=all members of the group are volunteers and do not receive any material support; 2=members are volunteers but they receive some material support such as money for public transportation and food; 3=some members are volunteers, but the leadership and core group (those most committed) get paid</p>
intl_support	<p>Whether or not the group received direct international support of any kind.</p> <p>1=group received direct international support; 0=otherwise</p>
type_intl_support	<p>Indicates the type of international support that the group directly received.</p> <p>1=political/diplomatic, 2=material (non-military), 3=military</p>
magnitude_intl_support	1=minimal to no support, 2=moderate level support, 3=significant support
size	Number of active members (highest number within the year)
formalization	<p>Indicator for the extent to which the activities of members (including the leadership, core members, and active members) are structured and governed by rules and procedures that are known to them and exercised accordingly.</p> <p>1=very low formalization, 2=moderate formalization, 3=high formalization</p>
factions	1 <sup>st</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Whether or not there is evidence of factions/wings/a strong dissenting clique within the group.


	1=there are factions within the group, 0=otherwise
leadership changes	2 <sup>nd</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Number of times that there was a change in leadership within the group.
split	3 <sup>rd</sup> indicator of internal cohesion: Whether or not the group splits. 1=group is a product of a split with another organization, 0=group is not the result of a group split
split_description	Describe those that split from the organization (their ideology? Followers of a particular leader?) and approximately how many left the group.
disappearance	First repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one disappearance. The disappearance could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
killling	2 <sup>nd</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one killing. The killing could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
torture	3 <sup>rd</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one case of torture. The torture could have happened in any part of Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
detention	4 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least once case of detention for political reasons. The detention could have happened in any part of Chile or in another country (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise
search	5 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Authorities searched the opposition group's grounds at least once ( <i>allanamientos</i> ). The search could have happened in any part of Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise  Note: Only applicable to territorial organizations because it would be almost impossible to obtain this data for other types of organizations.
forced_exile	6 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group has at least once case of forced exile; 0=otherwise
forced_displacement	7 <sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one case of forced displacement. The person(s) could have been forcibly displaced anywhere in Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise

layoff	<p>8<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one mass layoff; 0=otherwise</p> <p>Note: Only applicable to unions.</p>
harassment	<p>9<sup>th</sup> repression indicator: 1=Group suffered at least one incident of harassment, such as receiving personal threats or threats to family members in person or over the phone, packages with dead animals and threatening messages, their office or home catching fire, etc. These incidents could have happened anywhere in Chile (this variable does not just count the repression that took place in the Metropolitan Region); 0=otherwise</p>
<i>c_variable</i>	<p>This variable indicates the level of confidence that the coder has on the precision and trustworthiness of the data, considering the documents on which they are relying to code the row. The availability of the information and the credibility of the sources are two important factors that should be considered when making this judgment call.</p> <p>1=low confidence; 2=moderate confidence; 3=high confidence</p>
source	<p>Indicates the sources (archives, documents, web pages, books, articles, etc.) used to code the row of data. A separate Word document contains the bibliographic information of all the sources and each source has a number; these are the numbers that are entered in the dataset, separated by commas.</p>


## Appendix D: Additional Figures from Findings

*1974 Alliances:*


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
*1975 Alliances:*




*1976 Alliances:*




*1979 Alliances:*




*1980 Alliances:*




*1981 Alliances:*



*1982 Alliances:*




*1984 Alliances:*




*1985 Alliances:*

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*1986 Alliances:*



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*1987 Alliances:*

